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CIVIL PRACTICE
Jay C. Carlisle*
DEDICATION
The 1988 Survey Article on New York Civil Practice is dedicated
to former supreme court justice Joseph F. Gagliardi, who retired
on December 31, 1987, as the Administrative Judge for the
Ninth Judicial District.
I n his celebrated biography of Lord Carson, Marjonibanks
wrote: "A great lawyer's fame is always written in sand, and he
leaves behind him no permanent memorial . . . ." Justice Gagliardi's fame is not written in sand. He has left many opinions
and a legacy as one who many believe was New York State's
most outstanding administrative judge. The opinions are too numerous to highlight, let alone to mention; however each was
presented in lucid prose which is at once persuasive and pleasurable to read. His legacy is the respect and affectionhe earned
from the bench and bar for his extraordinary administrative accomplishments and for his dedication to each task no matter
how mundane.
Justice Gagliardi has also been extraordinarily supportive
of the Pace Law School since its founding in 1976. He has been a
loyal booster and an advisor and confident to three deans-thus
far-as well as numerous faculty members. Justice Gagliardi
conceived and developed the Law School's successful judicial internship program and has been instrumental in the placement
of Pace Law School graduates. He has been a guest lecturer at
the Law School's continuing legal education programs and has
been a frequent VIP at many of the School's receptions for distinguished dignitaries. Justice Gagliardi's excellence on the
bench and personal characteristics of fair play and leadership,

* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. J.D., University of California a t
Davis; A.B., University of California a t Los Angeles. Professor Carlisle is the annotation
author for the 1987 Supplement to the Weinstein, Korn & Miller treatise on New York Civil
Practice. The author wishes to express his sincere thanks to Professor Richard T. Farrell of
the Brooklyn Law School, Dr. Josephine Y. King of the Pace Law School, and Associate
Justice Issac Rubin of the Second Department for their encouragement, and to John Mulligan for his research assistance. The author is also grateful to Gloria Pagonico for typing this
article. Ms. Pagonico's patience and willingness to work overtime to produce this piece is
appreciated more than she can ever imagine.
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tempered by a wonderful sense of humor, have earned the deep
respect of students, faculty, deans and alumni of the Pace Law
School. He is a complete gentleman whose exemplary behavior
will serve as an inspiration to those fortunate to have known
him.
Administrative Judge for the Ninth Judicial District Joseph
F. Gagliardi, we will sorely miss you. Ad Multos Annos!

I. INTRODUCTION
..................................
11. NEW LEGISLATION
...............................
A. New CPLR Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. CPLR 211-A New Twenty Year Limitations Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. CPLR 214-b Agent Orange S t a t u t e . . . . . . .
3. CPLR 308(2)(4) Leave and Mail and Nail
and Mail: Alternative to Last Known Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. CPLR 5231: Law of Income Execution i n
New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. CPLR 8022: New Section Added Entitled
"Fee on Civil Appeal" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Merger and Reorganization of The New
York Court System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Rules
for the Trial Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Proposed Sanctions for Frivolous Litigation . .
D. New Rules for Appellate Terms in the Second
Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
...................................
111. JURISDICTION
A. Constitutional Limitations on I n Personain Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(1) Parts I, I1 & III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) Part II-B: No Jurisdiction Over Asahi . . . .
(3) Part II-A: The "Stream-of Commerce"
Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(4) Part II-A: Concurring Opinion by Justice
Brennan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(5) Part II-A: Concurring Opinion by Justice
Stevens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Heinonline - - 39 Syracuse L. Rev. 76 1988

19881

Civil Practice

(6) Effect of Asahi's Constitutioml Considerations on New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B . Bases for Exercise of Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . .
1. CPLR 301-General Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . .
2 . Long-Arm Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) CPLR 302(a)(I) Transaction of Business Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) CPLR 302(a) (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Enforcement of A Foreign Judgment: Whose
Law Determines Whether I n Personam Jurisdiction Was Properly Obtained . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D . Forum Non Conveniens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E . Statutory Requirements-Service of Summons
I . Service on a Natural Person . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . Leave and Mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Service on Defendant's Agent . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Nail and Mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Expedient Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Related Service Tips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) CPLR 312 Amended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) New York City's I n Rem Foreclosure
Notice Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(c) V T L 253 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(d) Re-Service I n the Courthouse . . . . . . . .
(e) Substituted Service I n Criminal Contempt Proceeding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(f) Service on Infant Through Guardian .
7. The Hague Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS
.........................
A . Section 203(b)(5): Delivery to Sheriff or
County Clerk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B . Section 203(e): The Relation Back Doctrine . .
C. CPLR 214-a: Exceptions to the General Rule .
D . CPLR 217: When is a Four-Month Time-Period
Applicable? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E . CPLR 214-c: Reviver Statute Challenged . . . . .
F . Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I . Federal Night Depository Box: General
Rule l(a) for the Southern District . . . . . .
2. CPLR 215(3) As Applied B y Federal Court
3. Toll B y Reason of Insanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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4. Notice of Claim Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Federal Superfund Amendment . . . . . . . . . .
6. Statute of Limitations: Extension I n Ac-

V.
VI.

VII.

VIII.

M.

tions Against Non Domiciliary Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MOTIONS
.......................................
DISCLOSURE
.....................................
A . CPLR 3101 ( d ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B . Expert Medical Witnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Disclosure I n Aid of Arbitration . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D . FOIL Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E . Sanctions For Disclosure Abuses . . . . . . . . . . . .
F . Article 31 Superceded By Surrogates Procedure Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
G. Disclosure Against State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
H. Non-Party Document Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . .
RES JUDICATA
AND COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL
..........
A . Administrative Determinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B . Arbitral Determinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MISCELLANEOUS
.................................
A . Certificate of Merit I n Medical Malpractice
Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B . Emotional Distress-A New Cause of Action? .
C. Collateral Source Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D . Periodic Payment of Awards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E . Moving For Leave to Appeal I n the Court of
Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
....................................
CONCLUSION

While 1986 was a watershed year for the CPLR practitioner.'
1987 passed with what one prominent commentator has referred "a
yawn."2 Nonetheless. there were several important amendments to
the CPLR in 1987 and our courts produced more than a few
1. See Carlisle. Civil Practice. 1986 Survey of N.Y.Law. 38 SYRACUSE
L.REV.67.69.85
(1987) (discussing the many new 1986 amendments to the Civil Practice Law and Rules
(hereinafter CPLR))
2. Professor Richard T Farrell of Brooklyn Law School. who was the Civil Practice
Survey author for ten years. has advised the current author that 1987 "passed with a yawn."

.

.
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''drabnS opinions worthy of discussion. Furthermore, the bar and
bench should rejoice because this year's Survey marks the twentyfifth anniversary of the CPLR4 and the fiftieth anniversary of the
Federal Rules of Civil Proced~re.~
It is also the sixty-fifth year
since a commentator first reviewed significant developments in
New York civil practi~e.~

Last year's Survey7 highlighted significant changes in the
3. See Rothschild, New York Civil Practice Simplified, 26 COLUMBIA
L. REV.30 (1926)
(commenting on the practice decisions in 1925, Professor Rothschild states that they "present a drab picture indeed" and "follow each other in endless procession like so many khaki
clad recruits stumbling along for lack of unified leadership.").
4. The Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) were adopted a t the 1962 legislative session and became effective on September 1, 1963. The CPLR replaced the Civil Practice Act
(hereinafter CPA) which was enacted in 1921. The CPA had superseded the Code of Civil
Procedure, known as the Throop Code which in turn had replaced the Field Code of 1848.
The CPLR was the product of six years of work by the Advisory Committee on Practice and
Procedure (Jackson A. Dykeman, Chairperson and Jack B. Weinstein, reporter) and two
years work by the Codes Committee of the Senate (John H. Hughes, chairperson) and Assembly (Julius Volker, Chairperson) and by the Senate Finance Committee (Austin W. Erwin, Chairperson). The Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure was established in
1955 by the Temporary Commission on the Courts (Harrison Tweed, Chairperson) after
several public hearings had demonstrated a need and demand for a complete study and
revision of the CPA. Research and drafting of the proposed provisions for the Advisory
Committee was supervised by Professor Jack B. Weinstein of Columbia Law School, Professor Daniel H. Distler of BufTalo Law School and Professor Harvey L. Korn of Columbia Law
School. Professor Louis R. Frumer of Syracuse Law School and Professor Louis Prashker of
St. Johns University Law School also participated in the project. The relevant chapters enacted in 1962 are as follows: 308, 309, 310, 311, 237, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317 and 318.
Governor Rockefeller approved these acts establishing the CPLR in 1962 and they became
effective on September 1, 1963.
5. Congress authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate general rules of civil procedure for the United States District Courts and Courts of Appeal by the Act of June 19,
1934, Ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended a t 28 U.S.C. 2072) (1982). The
Court adopted the original rules on December 20,1937 and the Attorney General forwarded
them to Congress on January 3,1938. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective
on September 16,1938. See 308 U.S. 645, 647-49 (1938).
6. The first Survey on New York Civil Practice was authored by Professor Jay Leo
Rothschild of Brooklyn Law School and published in 23 COLUMBIA
L. REV.732 (1923). The
current Survey has been published for the past twenty-five years by the Syracuse Law Review and prior thereto, since 1946, by the N.Y.U. Law Review. Prior Survey authors include
Chief Judge Charles Desmond, Professor Herbert Pettifruend of N.Y.U., Former Dean Joseph McLaughlin of Fordham University Law School and Professor Richard T. Farrell of
Brooklyn Law School.
L,REV.67 (1987).
7. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1986Survey of N.Y.Law, 38 SYRACUSE

Heinonline - - 39 Syracuse L . Rev. 79 1988

80

Syracuse Law Review

[vol. 39:75

CPLR8 and discussed the uniform court rules.9 In 1987, there were
fewer changes by the Legislature; however, modifications and additions to the uniform rules have been proposed.1° Also, the Chief
Administrative Judge of New York has proposed new rules relating
to sanctions in civil matters," and new rules are now effective in
the Appellate Term for the Second Department.lz

A. New CPLR Legislation
Twenty of the seventy articles of the CPLR were amended in
1987.lS The most important amendments are mentioned below.
1. CPLR 211: A New Twenty Year Limitations Period"
Subdivision (e) of CPLR 211 was added by Ch. 815, Laws of
1987.16 It establishes a twenty year period for any action or proceeding to enforce any judgment, temporary order or permanent
order of any court that awards support, alimony or maintenance,
regardless of whether or not arrears have been reduced to a money
judgment.16 The new subdivision applies only to orders entered after July 2, 1987.17 Previously entered orders do not get the benefit
of the twenty year period.18

2. CPLR 214(b): Agent Orange Statute1@
Chapter 194, Laws of 1987, effective June 29, 1987, extends
the time within which Agent Orange actions must be brought to

8. See id. a t 69-85; see also Civil Practice, 1986 Survey, supra note 6, a t 130-40.
9. See id. a t 83-85.
10. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
12. See 198 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 1987, a t 1, col. 3.
13. The following sections of the CPLR were amended during the Survey year: 211(e),
214-b, 308(2) and (4), 312, 318, 321(a), 1101(a), 3012-a, 3045, 4546, 5205(c), 5231, 5241(c),
5242,7804(i), 8011-a, 8012(d), 8018(a), and 8020(a). Each of the foregoing amendments became effective on or prior to January 1,1988. The important amendments are highlighted in
the Survey. In addition CPLR 8022, which is discussed in this Survey, was enacted and
became effective November 5, 1987. See infra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
14. See N.Y. CPLR 211 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1470 (codified a t
15. Act of Aug. 7, 1987 ch. 815, 1987 MCKINNEY'S
N.Y. CPLR 211(e) (McKinney Supp. 1988)).
16. See N.Y. CPLR 211(e) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See N.Y. CPLR 214(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
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June 16, 1988.2O This marks the fourth one-year extension of the
Agent Orange tort revival law first enacted in 1981.
3. CPLR 308(2)(4): "Leave and Mail" and "Nail and Mailya1

Under CPLR 308(2),22as amended by Ch. 115, Laws of 1987,
effective July 15, 1987,2s it is permissible to mail a copy of the
summons to the defendant by first class mail to his actual place of
business?' This is an alternative to mailing a copy to the defendThe mailing must be in an envelant at his last known addre~s.2~
The envelope
ope bearing the words "personal and c~nfidential."~~
may not indicate on the outside, by return address or otherwise,
that it is from an attorney or that it relates to an action at law
against the person served.27Chapter 115 of the Laws of 1987 made
an identical amendment to CPLR 308(4)28which provides for personal service by "nail and mail."2s
4. CPLR 5231: Law of Income Execution I n New Yorkso

Chapter 829, Laws of 1987, effective August 7, 1987, provides
that no amount of income may be withheld from a debtor's earnings unless his "disposable earnings" exceeds thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage2l The income execution cannot exceed
the amount by which a debtor's disposable earnings surpass that
figure; nor can the execution exceed twenty-five percent of his disposable earnings.s2 Even as amended, CPLR 5231 provides that an

See N.Y. CPLR 214(b) comment 1 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
See N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
See id.
Act of July 15, 1987, ch. 115,1987 MCKINNEY'S
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 236-37 (codified
at N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney Supp. 1987)).
24. See N.Y. CPLR 308(2) ( M c K i e y 1972 & Supp. 1988).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Act of July 15, 1987, ch. 115, 1987 MCKINNEY'S
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 236-37 (codified
at N.Y. CPLR 308(4) ( M c K i e y Supp. 1988)).
29. See N.Y. CPLR 308(4) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
30. See N.Y. CPLR 5231 (McKiney 1978 & Supp. 1988).
31. The current federal minimum hourly wage is $3.35; therefore, the maximum
amount that can be withheld is $100.50.
32. See N.Y. CPLR 5231(c) (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1988). The judgment debtor's
disposable earnings are defined by new subdivision (c) of CPLR 5231 to include compensation payable for personal services (including pension payments) "after the deduction from
20.
21.
22.
23.
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income execution may not exceed ten percent of a debtor's gross
earnings.ss CPLR 5231 also requires that an income execution delivered to a sheriff include a notice setting forth the statutory limits on the amount of the executi~n.~'
Additionally, the form of the
notice is prescribed by subdivision (g) of CPLR 5231.35 CPLR
5232(a) and (c) require that a copy of the execution be delivered
by the sheriff to the garnishee and to the debt0r.8~
5. CPLR 8022: New Section added entitled "Fee on Civil
Appeal
jJs7

Chapter 825, section 16 of the Laws of 1987,8" which establishes a program to assist local governments in the financing and
improvement of court facilities throughout the state, added a new
section 8022 to article 80 of the CPLR.s9 The new provision, which
became effective on November 5, 1987, imposes a fee of $200.00
each time a civil record on appeal or statement in lieu of record is
filed in the appellate division or the Court of Appeals.'O Persons
granted poor person relief are exempt from payment of the fee.'l
Additionally, because the statute only applies to civil appeals, the
fee is not applicable to article 78 proceedings that are transferred
to the appellate division pursuant to CPLR 7804(g) or in proceedAt least one appelings that originate in the appellate divisi~n."~

those earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld." When calculating disposable
earnings, therefore, one has to exclude money withheld for taxes and social security as well
as deductions made pursuant to orders of support of alimony or maintenance. See id.
33. See N.Y. CPLR 5231(g) (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1988).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See N.Y. CPLR 5321(a)(c) ( M c K i e y 1978 & Supp. 1988). The Legislature
amended CPLR 5231 to conform it to federal law. In Follette v. Vitanza, 658 F. Supp. 492
(N.D.N.Y. 1987), the federal district court found that New York law authorized income executions in amounts which exceeded those permitted by the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1673 (1982). See id. a t 512. The court also held that the debtors had a
due process right to be notiiied of their federal rights. See id. a t 513.
37. See N.Y. CPLR 8022 ( M c K i e y Supp. 1988).
38. See Act of Nov. 5, 1987, ch. 825, 1987 MCKINNEY'S
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1565-67
(codified a t N.Y. CPLR 8022 (McKinney Supp. 1988)).
39. See id.
40. See N.Y. CPLR 8022 ( M c K i e y Supp. 1988); see also Anderson, Court Fees Rise
Tomorrow For Filing of Civil Actions, 198 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 4, 1987, a t 1, col. 3.
41. See id.
42. See N.Y. CPLR 8022 (McKinney Supp. 1988); see also Newman, Appellate Practice, 198 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 19,1987, a t 1, col. 1(full discussion of $200.00 fling fee for both the
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late division has indicated it does not plan to impose the fee in
expedited election case^."^
Many other state court fees have increased as a result of chapter 825, Laws of 1987.'( For example, the typical filing of a civil
case in supreme court and county court has been increased by
$45.00.'6 In addition, the former $35.00 fee to buy an index number is now $100.00 but the $70.00 fee for filing a note of issue to
place the case on the trial calendar has been eliminated.'6 Moreover, a new $50.00 charge has been added for the issuance of a
request for judicial intervention."
6. Merger and Reorganization of the New York State Court
System

Most Survey articles do not mention legislative inaction.
Nonetheless, the practitioner should be alerted to the failure of the
Legislature to give second passage to the proposed constitutional
amendment to provide for merger and reorganization of our state's
court sy~tern.'~The proposed merger of New York7s trial courts
was declared "dead" by Governor Cuomo in June and formally
buried when the Legislature left Albany in July without voting on
the iss~e.'~
There are eleven different trial courts in New York State with
separate judicial systems each dealing with different aspects of
civil matters.60 Some proceedings must be brought in more than
one of these systems in order to achieve the desired end, and fre-

Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals).
43. See Newman, supra note 42 (referring to the Appellate Division for the Second
Department).
44. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
45. See N.Y. CPLR 8022 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See Kaufman, 44th Street Notes: The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York (Letter From The President), vol. 2, no. 9 (Oct. 1987). New York State Constitution
requires that a proposed constitutional amendment be passed by two separate Legislatures
after an intervening general election and that the second passage take place during the first
session of the newly elected Legislature. The failure of the Legislature to give second passage, so that the proposal could be submitted to vote by the citizens of New York State, sets
back the movement for court reorganization by a t least two years, if not longer.
49. McMahon, Court Merger Buried by Legislature, 198 N.Y.L.J., July 14, 1987, a t 1,
col. 3.
50. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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quently, the same question can be in one system or another depending on how it is br~ught.~'Similarly, our current byzantine
court structure means that some justices have greater staffs and
facilities than are available to others presiding over cases of major
irnportanceP2Robert M. Kaufman, president of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, has recently remarked that "the
cost of inefficiency" is high and "justice is denied" to many litig a n t ~ We
. ~ ~should seek strength from the words of Chief Judge
Sol Wachtler who states, "Court merger, like all elements of court
reform, is not a game for the short ~inded."~'
Your author hopes that next year's Survey can discuss the
movement for a logical structure of the courts more optimistically.

B. Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Rules for the Trial
Courts
The proposed amendments to the Uniform Rules were distributed to the bench and bar on July 15, 1987,66and should be effective, as revised, by April 1, 1988P6 The proposed amendments
make changes in the Supreme Court Civil Rules with respect to the
Individual Assignment System (IAS) and make a substantial number of changes in the Surrogate's Court rules. The proposed
amendments include sections 202.3 (individual assignment system), 202.6 (request for judicial intervention), 202.7 (calendaring of

51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See McMahon, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
55. See Memorandum from Chief Administrative Judge Albert M. Rosenblatt, Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Rules for the Trial Courts (July 15,1987) (on file in the
Law Review Office a t Syracuse University College of Law).
56. Telephone interview with W i i a m Bullman, Esq.,of the Office of Court Administration (OCA) and Professor Jay C. Carlisle (Dec. 14, 1987) (Mr.Bullman's customary modesty
prevents him from takiig credit for the development and implementation of the new uniform rules; however the bench and bar know better and respectfully salute him for his many
contributions to our profession.) For the bar's response to the uniform rules and the individual assignment system, see generally ZAS Gets Good, Poor Marks I n State Survey of Lawyers, 198 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3,1987, a t 1, col. 3 (discussing state bar survey of 3,000 lawyers and
concluding that the results "seem to indicate that negative feelings expressed towards IAS
are . . . the result of dissatisfaction of the way the system is working and not with the
concept of IAS."). See also Wise, OCA Data On ZAS Judges: How the Lawyers View It, 198
N.Y.L.J. Oct. 23, 1987, a t 1, col. 3 (including statistics on dispositions by judges handling
civil cases in State Supreme Court in Manhattan); Note, OCA's Rule-Making Procedures
Explained By Chief Administrative Judge, 29 State Bar News, a t 2, (Dec. 1987).
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motions, uniform notice of motion form, and a r m a t i o n of good
faith), 202.8 (motion procedure), and 202.12 (preliminary conference) of the Uniform Civil Rules of the Supreme Court and County
The proposed changes suggested for the IAS rules include: sections 202.3 (adding an exception to the IAS for the optional creation of a "dual track" system of assignment of trial-ready cases),
202.6 (adding a requirement limited to New York City that a copy
of the receipt of purchase of an index number be attached to the
request for judicial intervention), and 202.8 (streamlining the requirements for the submission of motion papers and the scheduling of the hearing motions).68Section 202.12 will make the requirement of a mandatory preliminary conference optional,6n and
section 202.7 (requiring an attorney's a m a t i o n of good faith with
respect to a motion) will be limited to disclosure and bill of particulars motions?O

C. Proposed Sanctions For Frivolous Litigation Practices
The Office of Court Administration (OCA) distributed its proposed rule on sanctions for frivolous litigation practices on July 15,
1987.61There has been a large and vociferous response to the pro-

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See id. Mr. Bullman stated that "it is highly likely" that U.R. 202.7 will be limited
to disclosure and bill of particulars motions. He also reminded your author that the final
decision on every proposed rule, as well as the date of its implementation, will be made by a
majority of the Administrative Board which consists of Chief Judge Wachtler and the presiding justices of the four appellate divisions.
61. See Memorandum from Chief Administrative Judge Albert M. Rosenblatt, supra
note 55; see also Proposed Part 37 of the Rules of the Chief Judge, Award of Costs and
Impositions of Financial Sanctions For Frivolous Conduct I n Civil Litigation (copy on file
a t the Law Review Office of the Syracuse University College of Law). For a text of the rules,
see 198 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 21, 1987, a t 3. See also Menaker, Sanctions for Frivolous Litigation:
Should New York Have a Counterpart to Federal Rule 11,59 N.Y.S. Bar J. 31 (Nov. 1987).
See generally D. Wise, County Bar Report Objects to Draft of Sanction Rules, 198
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5, 1987, a t 1, col. 1 (discussing many objections to the OCA draft for court
imposed sanctions against attorneys who engage in frivolous litigation); Comment Asked On
Rules Plan For Sanctions, 198 N.Y.L.J. Aug. 21, 1987, a t 1 col. 2; S. Stein, Roundup of
Significant Rulings by New York Court of Appeals, 198 N.Y.L.J. Mar. 12, 1987 a t 1, col. 3
(discussing A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d 1, 503 N.E.2d 681, 511
N.Y.S.2d 216 (1986), as well as the concept of court imposed sanctions).
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posed rulee2and, by the Survey's date of publication, the Administrative Board should have decided whether to accept or reject it.68
The rule, if adopted, will be part 130 of the Rules of the Chief
Administrative Judge!'
Part 130 applies to frivolous conduct for
"any civil action or proceeding" and thereby extends CPLR 8303ae6to all other forms of acti0n.6~Although costs and sanctions together can not exceed $lO,OOO,6' an award may be made to a party
or attorneyes as a compensatory award.69 An award may be made
against a party or attorney; however, if made against the attorney,
the proceeds will be paid to the Client's Security Fund.70 Under
part 130 of the Rules, no award can be made except by motion on
notice or by the courts sua ~ p o n t e . ~This
l rule requires that there
be a "reasonable opportunity to be heard." Additionally, the court
must define in a "written memorandum" the offensive behavior
and discuss why it constitutes "frivolous conduct."72
It should be noted that part 130 of the Rules has been severely
criticized on the grounds that, like its counterpart, FRCP ll,?= it

62. See Wise, County Bar Report Objects t o Draft of Sanction Rules, 198 N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 5,1987, at 1, col. 1; Report of the Sanctions Subcommittee of the New York State Bar
Association Committee on the CPLR (discussing reasons for and against adopting rule)
[hereinafter N Y S B A CPLR Committee Sanctions Report] (on file at the Law Review Office
o f the Syracuse University College o f Law); Telephone interview with William Bullman,
Esq., o f the OCA (Dec. 14, 1987); see also supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
63. Telephone interview with Michael Colodner, Esq., Counsel to the OCA, (Dec. 14,
1987).
64. See Memorandum from Chief Administrative Judge Albert M. Rosenblatt, supra
note 55.
65. See N.Y. CPLR 8303-a (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1987) (assesses costs and reasonable attorney's fees o f up t o $10,000 when frivolous claims or defenses are filed in tort cases
in New York State courts); see Carlisle, supra note 7 , at 79-82; Carlisle, CPLR 8303-a: Attorney's Fees Sanctions for Frivolous Claims and Defenses Filed i n Tort Cases, 14 Westchester Bar J., 273 (Summer 1987) (for a more complete discussion o f CPLR 8303-a).
66. See supra note 64.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.; see also Siegel, 331 N.Y.S. L. Dig. (July 1982) (full discussion o f the proposed rule including a fifteen-point checklist alerting the members o f the bar to the more
apparent features o f the sanctions rule).
73. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See generally Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1987); Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 H o ~ s n uL. REV.
66 (Spring 1986) For the most recent Survey year discussion o f how Federal Rules o f Civil
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will generate unnecessary motion practice.74 The practitioner
should also be aware that Assembly Bill 8193,16 if enacted, would
extend CPLR 8303-a to all civil actions.76 It will, however, apply
sanctions more narrowly than the rule proposed by the 0CAT7 ASsembly Bill 8193 provides explicit protection for intellectually
novel arguments and establishes a statutory appeals process
whereby a judge can be reversedTS In any event, whether it be by
the legislature or the courts, civil practice lawyers should expect a
sanction rule to be in effect shortly after the publication of this
Survey.

D. New Rules for Appellate Term in the Second Department
Effective March 1, 1988 a comprehensive revision of the rules
governing the filing of appeals in the appellate terms in Appellate
Division, Second Department, becomes operable.79 The principal

Procedure is applied in New York federal courts, see Silberberg, Civil Practice Roundups in
Southern District, 198 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 3, 1987, a t 1, col. 1 (discussing significant sanctions
decisions handed down by the Southern District in October, 1987). See also Kohn, Frivolous
Suits Cause Sanctions I n U.S. Court, 198 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 9, 1987, a t 1, col. 2 (discussing
fines against both litigants and their lawyers).
74. See Chase, Sanctions in State Courts-Proposed Rule Needs Changes, 198
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 22,1987, a t 1, col. 3 (disadvantages of judicial sanctions are likely to outweigh
the advantages); see also Menaker, Sanctions for Frivolous Litigation: Should New York
Have a Counterpart to Federal Rule 11, 59 N.Y.S.B.J. 31 (Nov. 1987) (federal rule has a
number of weaknesses to be avoided in any New York rule). For a discussion of the pitfalls
of Rule 11, see generally Bates, The Rule 11 Debate, 4 Years Later, Nat'l Law J., Oct. 13,
1987, a t 3, col. 1.
75. See E.J. McMahon, Assembly Bill Would Impose Sanctions for Frivolous Suits,
198 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 18, 1987, a t 1, col. 3 (discussing proposed additional sanctions for frivolous lawsuits and baseless pleadings).
76. See id.
77. Telephone interview with Assemblyman Daniel L. Feldman (Dec. 17, 1987). Assemblyman Feldman of Brooklyn is the sponsor of Assembly Bill 8193 and advises your author
that it explicitly provides for protection of intellectually novel arguments, provides for a
more equitable statutory appeals process, limits the cap on awards, fees and costs, and
removes the aura of a "chilling effect" that currently exists in connection with the OCA
proposed sanction rule.
78. See id. In response to Assemblyman Feldman's observation, W i a m Bullman of
the OCA argues that the proposed OCA sanctions rule should not be confused with the
federal rule. The OCA rule abbreviates many of the Rule 11 pitfalls: i.e., it places a lid on
the award; carefully construes the phrase frivolous; gives the trial judge discretionary power
to impose the sanction; and provides for more due process in the form of hearings than does
its federal counterpart.
79. A copy of these revisions is on file in the Law Review Office a t the Syracuse University College of Law.
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differences for litigators are new rules affecting the calendaring of
cases. Under the new rules, notes of issue for civil cases must be
filed on or before the first Friday of the month.BOIn addition, the
appellant must supply blank stamped post cards addressed to
every appellant and re~pondent.~'Notification of the term to
which an appeal has been assigned will be accomplished by using
the postcards. Other portions of the new rules can be obtained
from the Appellant Term.

A. Constitutional Limitations on I n Personam Jurisdiction
Last year's Survey discussed some of the relevant constitutional considerations necessary for the assertion of jurisdiction in
New York.B2During this Survey year the United States Supreme
Court analyzed these considerations in Asahi Metal Industry Co.
u. Superior Court of C a l i f ~ r n i aAlthough
.~~
the case has generated
Asahi merits discussion because of its approach
sparse
to the doctrine of minimum contacts.B6 It also serves as another
example of how fourteenth amendment due process limitations are
placed on state-structured long arm statutes in unintentional tort
The Asahi facts are simple.B7The plaintiff, Gary Zurcher, lost
control of his Honda motorcycle and collided with a tractor.s8
Zurcher was severely injured and his wife, a passenger, was killed.88

80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t 85-88.
83. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987) (holding that the exercise of jurisdiction by the California
court over a Japanese manufacturer would be unreasonable and unfair).
84. See Repa, Supreme Court Preview, 72 A.B.A.J., Dec. 1, 1986, a t 42; Stewart, Supreme Court Report, A.B.A.J., Apr. 1, 1987, a t 45; Hoenig, Products Liability, 198 N.Y.L.J.,
May. 27, 1987, a t 1, col. 1.
85. See infra notes 103-31 and accompanying text.
86. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); see also
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 407 (1984). See generally Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); J.
WEINSTEIN,
H. KORN& A. MILLER,NEWYORKCIVIL PRACTICE
3 301.03 (1986) [hereinafter
WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER];Siegel, 297 N.Y. St. L. Dig. 1(1984) (state "long-arm'' statutea
are more expansively construed in cases involving intentional torts).
87. See 107 S. Ct. a t 1029.
88. See id.
89. See id.
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Zurcher filed a products liability action in the Superior Court of
the State of California alleging that the accident was caused by an
explosion in the rear tire of the motorcycle and that the tire, tube,
and sealant were defective.BOThe complaint, filed by Zurcher,
named, inter alia, Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co. (Cheng
Shin), the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube?' Cheng Shin filed
a cross-complaint seeking indemnification from its co-defendants
and from Asahi Metal Industry Co. (Asahi), the Japanese manufacturer of the tube's valve assembly.92After Zurcher's claims were
settled for $300,000, the only remaining part of the lawsuit was
. ~ ~ moved
Cheng Shin's indemnification claim against A ~ a h i Asahi
to quash Cheng Shin's service of summons on the grounds that
California could not exert jurisdiction over it consistent with the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.s4
Asahi argued that the valve assemblies were sold to Cheng
Shin in Taiwan and that Asahi had no offices, property, or agents
in California and made no direct sales within the state.s5 As a result, Asahi claimed that it did not have the minimum contacts with
California that were necessary for personal jurisdiction to satisfy
the due process clause.B8Asahi also alleged that jurisdiction in California was unfair because the action involved a dispute between a
The California SuJapanese company and a Taiwanese c~mpany.~'
preme Court ruled that Asahi had to defend the action in California.s8 The court based its decision on the fact that Asahi intention-

90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. a t 1029-30.
93. See id. a t 1030.
94. See id. a t 1029. California's long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction
"on any bases not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States."
CAL.CN. PROC.CODE§ 410.10 (West 1973) (this statute is far more expansive than New
York's long-arm statute CPLR 302 which does not provide for in personam jurisdiction in
every case in which due process will permit it). See Banco Ambrosiano S.P.A. v. Aroc Bank
& Trust, Ltd, 62 N.Y.2d 65,71-72, 464 N.E.2d 432, 435, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64, 67 (1984).
95. See Asahi, 107 S. Ct. a t 1030.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 702 P.2d 543, 216
Cal. Rptr. 385 (1985). The California Supreme Court noted that "Asahi has no offices, property or agents in California and has made no direct sales [in California]." Id. a t 48-49, 702
P.2d a t 549-50,216 Cal. Rptr. a t 392. Moreover, "Asahi did not design or control the system
of distribution that carried its valve assemblies into California." Id. a t 49, 702 P.2d a t 549,
216 Cal. Rptr. a t 392. Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court held that the exercise of in
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ally placed its valve assembly components into the stream of
commerce and was aware that some of them would eventually find
their way into California.BBThe United States Supreme Court reversed in a complex voting pattern.loOJustice O'Connor announced
the Court's judgment, and her opinion was joined in its entirety by
Justice Powell and Chief Justice Rehnquist. The judgment in Part
I was unanimous; four members of the Court joined the plurality
opinion in Part 11-A.lo1 Eight members of the Court joined the
opinion in Part 11-B, and five justices participated in two separate
concurrences disagreeing with the plurality opinion in Part 11-A.lo8
Thus, the opinion consists of three parts and two concurrence^.'^^
The bottom line is that a unanimous Court concluded that it was
unreasonable for California to assert personal jurisdiction over
Asahi.lo4
1. Parts I, 11 & 111

Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of a unanimous
Court with respect to Part I and an opinion for eight members of

personam jurisdiction over Asahi was consistent with the due process clause. See id. a t 54,
702 P.2d a t 555, 216 Cal. Rptr. a t 396.
99. See id. a t 42,702 P.2d a t 550,216 Cal. Rptr. a t 392. "When Asahi sold value assemblies to Cheng Shin with knowledge that they would be placed in tubes sold in California,
its purpose fully availed itself of the California market and the benefits and protections of
California's laws." Id.
100. See Asahi, 107 S. Ct. a t 1029; see akio infra note 103 and accompanying text.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. The lineup for the Asahi opinion is as follows: Part I, a unanimous Court agrees
not to assert jurisdiction over Asahi; Part 11-A, Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Powell, and Justice Scalia issue a plurality opinion urging that jurisdiction should
not be asserted over Asahi under the stream of commerce theory; Part 11-B, all Justices with
the exception of Justice Scalia join the opinion of the Court which holds that it would be
unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over Asahi; Part 111, a one paragraph statement joined by
Justices Rehnquist, Powell, Scalia, and O'Connor that the facts in Asahi do not establish
jurisdiction under stream of commerce; Concurrence I, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
White, Marshall, and Blackmum, agreeing with the Court's judgment in Part I and conclusion in Part 11-B that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Asahi would not comport
with fair play and substantial justice, but disagreeing with the plurality's conclusion that
Asahi did not purposely avail itself of the California market; and Concurrence 11, Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices White and Blackmum join Parts I and 11-B but do not join Part
11-A for two reasons: first, an examination of minimum contacts was not necessary to the
Court's decision, and second, assuming such an examination to be necessary, Part 11-A misapplied its "contacts" analysis to the facts of the case.
104. See id.
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the Court with respect to Part II-B.106 She also delivered an opinion with respect to Part 11-A and Part I11 in which Chief Justice
Rhenquist and Justices Scalia and Powell joined.lo8
2. Part II-B: No Jurisdiction Over Asahi

Using the traditional convenience test developed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,lo7the Court's opinion in Part 11-B
which was joined by all justices with the exception of Scalia, considered the burden on the defendant, the plaintifPs interest in having a forum in which to litigate, the interests of the forum state,
and the interests of the interstate judicial system.lo8 The critical
consideration was that the entire law suit, other than Cheng Shin's
claim against Asahi, had been resolved.10BBecause neither remaining party was a resident of California, the Court found California's
interest in the case to be minimal.l1° Additionally, the Court did
not favor California law governing the question of an indemnification claim between two foreign parties.'ll Moreover, the Court
warned that "great care and reserve should be exercised when extending notions of personal jurisdiction into the international
field," and stressed the heavy burden on the alien defendant.l12
Justice Brennan, who since his appointment to the United States
Supreme Court has never voted against finding personal jurisdiction, agreed with the Court's conclusion in Part 11-B that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Asahi would not comport with the
requirements of International Shoe v. Wa~hington."~Brennan
stated that Asahi was one of those rare cases in which "minimum
requirements inherent in the concept of 'fair play and substantial
justice' . . . defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though]
the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities."l14

105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
108. See Asahi, 107 S.Ct at 1033-35.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 1035.
113. See id. at 1035-38 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310).
114. See id. at 1035. It is also interesting to note that Asahi appears to be the first
unanimous Supreme Court decision against in penonam jurisdiction since the Court's 1945
decision in International Shoe.
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3. Part 11-A: Purposeful Availment (The Stream of Commerce

Theory)
Part 11-A of the opinion is a plurality holding unnecessary to
the Court's unanimous decision not to assert jurisdi~tion."~Four
members of the Court urged in Part 11-A that the mere placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without additional
activities, was not a purposeful act by the defendant directed toward the forum state.l16 The plurality found that "something"
more was required and referred to activities which evidence an "intent" or "purpose" to serve the market in the forum state."' The
plurality suggested these activities include designing the product
for the market in the forum state, advertising in the forum state,
establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in
the forum state, or marketing the product through a distributor
who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum state.n8
Because the facts only established Asahi's awareness that some of
the valves sold to Cheng Shin would be incorporated into the tire
tubes sold in California, the plurality concluded that Asahi did not
purposefully avail itself of the California market.l19 Thus, according to the plurality, jurisdiction cannot be asserted over a nondomiciliary defendant whose only contacts with the forum state consist
of the placement of a product into the stream of commerce.1a0
4. Part 11-A: Concurring Opinion by Justice Brennan

Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, who joined in the
opinion not to uphold jurisdiction, also joined Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion that the plurality's reasoning in Part 11-A was a
narrow construction of the stream of commerce theory and represented a "marked retreat" from the Court's analysis in WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. W o ~ d s o n . 'Justice
~~
Brennan reasoned

115. See Asahi, 107 S.Ct. at 1031-33.
116. See id. at 1033 ("additional conduct" may consist of "designing the product for
the market in the forum state, advertising in the forum state, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum state, or marketing the product through a
distributor who has agreed to serve as a sales agent in the forum state.").
117. See id. at 1032-33.
118. See id.
119. See id.; see also supra notes 87-90and accompanying text.
120. See Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
121. See id. at 1035-36(citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286).
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that once Asahi placed its product in the "stream of commerce,"
and was generally aware that the final product was being marketed
in California, "the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a
s~rprise."'~~
Justice Brennan found that a defendant's awareness
that the stream of commerce may or will sweep a product into the
forum state constitutes purposeful awareness.12s Brennan saw no
need for a "showing" of additional activities and reasoned that a
defendant who places goods into the stream of commerce benefits
economically from the retail sale of the final product in the forum
State and indirectly benefits from the state's laws that regulate
and facilitate commercial activity.12'

5. Part 11-A: Concurring Opinion by Justice Stevens

In a second concurring opinion, Justices Stevens, White, and
Blackmun, who had joined the decision not to uphold jurisdiction,
also disagreed with the plurality's purposeful availment (stream of
commerce) analysis in Part II-A.126First, Justice Stevens pointed
~~
he
out that it was not necessary to the Court's d e ~ i s i 0 n . lSecond,
observed that even assuming the plurality's purposeful availment
analysis ought to be formulated, Part 11-A misapplied it to the
Asahi facts.12?Stevens criticized the assumption that an unwavering line could be drawn between "mere awareness" that a component would find its way into the forum state and "purposeful availment of the forum's market."12s
Justice Stevens emphasized a constitutional analysis that is effected by the volume, value, and hazardous character of the com-

122. See id.; see also C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER,
FEDERAL
PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL
1069 (1969); Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV.L. REV.1121 (1966) (providing a full definition of the stream of commerce theory);
Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois,
1963 U . ILL.LAWFORUM,
533, 546-560(1963) (tracing development of the stream of commerce theory). Interestingly enough, Justice White, who authored the opinion in WorldWide Votkswagen, subscribes to this notion as he does to the observation that jurisdiction
"premised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce is consistent with the
Due Process Clause and [has] not required a showing of additional conduct." See Asahi, 107
S. Ct. at 1035.
123. See Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1035.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 1038.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.

Heinonline

--

39 Syracuse L . Rev. 93 1988

94

Syracuse Law Review

[vol. 39:75

ponents to determine if Asahi had engaged in a "higher quantum
of conduct" than placement of a product into the stream of commerce without more.12s This approach represents a middle ground
between the plurality opinion with respect to Part 11-A and Justice Brennan's concurrence thereto. Justice Stevens explained that
based on the volume, value, and hazardous character of the components, Asahi had engaged in a higher quantum of conduct than the
mere placement of a product into the stream of commerce.1s0Justice Stevens concluded that a regular course of business activity
that results in deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a period of several years would constitute a "purposeful availment"
even though the item delivered to the forum state was a standard
product marketed throughout the world.lsl This analysis by Justice
Stevens is similar to the approach followed by New York State appellate courts in Darienzo v. Wise Shoe Stores Inc.lS2and in Allen
v. Canadian Electric Co.lsS It is also compatible with the Court of
Appeals' decision in Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel.ls4

129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 1038. Justice Stevens first explains that Part 11-A of the opinion was not
necessary to the Court's decision. "An examination of minimum contacts is not always necessary to determine whether a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitutional." Id. He then states that "even assuming that the test ought to be formulated here,
Part 11-A misapplies it to the facts of this case." Id. Justice Stevens agrees with the Brennan view of minimum contacts but is cautious that "a higher quantum of conduct" than the
mere placement of a product into the stream of commerce is necessary. Id. He suggests that
delivering 100,000 units annually over a period of several years constitutes purposeful availment "even though the item delivered to the forum state was a standard product marketed
throughout the world." Id.
132. 74 A.D.2d 342,427 N.Y.S.2d 831 (2d Dep't 1980) (New Hampshire seller of shoes
to Tennessee retailer could have foreseen that five percent of the shoes would end up in the
New York market). But see Martinez v. American Standard, 91 A.D.2d 652,457 N.Y.S.2d 97
(2d Dep't 1982), aff'd,60 N.Y.2d 873, 458 N.E.2d 826, 470 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1983).
133. 65 A.D.2d 39,410 N.Y.S.2d 707 (3d Dep't 1978) (although it amounted to only one
percent of defendants sales, the approximately nine million dollars per year generated in
New York was deemed substantial).
134. 46 N.Y.2d 197, 385 N.E.2d 1055, 413 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1978). Jurisdiction was sustained when the plaintiff alleged that defendant had sought to hire one of the plaintiff's
former employees in order to tortiously induce him to reveal trade secrets to the defendant.
See Sybron, 46 N.Y.2d a t 203-04,385 N.E.2d a t 1058,413 N.Y.S.2d a t 130-31. The Court of
Appeals held that forum consequences could be foreseen within the meaning of subparagraph (ii) of CPLR 302 (a)(3) because "[gliven that Sybron manufactures the equipment in
New York, that Wetzel worked a t Sybron in New York for 34 years, and that Sybron customers in New York are being pursued, it is reasonable that De Deitrich foresee New York
as the place injury will occur." Id. a t 206, 385 N.E.2d a t 1060, 413 N.Y.S.2d a t 132.
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6. Effect of Asahi's Constitutional Consideration in New York

There remains the question of what guidance the Asahi opinion provides for the New York bar. After 110 years of jurisdictional
developments since Pennoyer v. Neff,135 is Asahi the best the
United States Supreme Court can do? Clearly, indemnification
claims between two alien defendants, such as in Asahi, will not
warrant an assertion of in personam jurisdiction by a New York
court.136Asahi, however, portends that our courts may assert longarm jurisdiction over alien and domestic defendants who place
products into the international or interstate markets even if there
is not a specific showing of awareness that the products were

135. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In Pennoyer v. Neff, Justice Field, writing for the majority, set
forth two interrelated rules: (1) "that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over the persons and property within its territory," and (2) "that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory." Pennoyer, 95 U.S. a t 722. After Pennoyer, there have been several major incursions upon the
rigidity of the territorial theory and several bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction developed.
Under present law, as enunciated by Internutional Shoe, 326 U.S. a t 320, the test for subjecting a nondomiciliary to a forum in personam jurisdiction is that "he have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Id. The Shoe test has been refined by
the U.S. Supreme Court in recent years. Immediately prior to its opinion in Asahi, the
Court issued opinions in the following key cases: Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985) (nonresident defendant who voluntarily entered into a contract that had a substantial connection with the forum state subject to that state's jurisdiction in a suit for breach of
contract even though he had never been in the forum state); Calder v. Jones, 470 U.S. 522
(1984) (defendant was within the constitutional reach of California courts even though he
had never been in California, because he intentionally committed acts in Florida with
knowledge that the acts could injure the plaintiff in California); Helicopteros Nationales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 407 (1984) (drawing an important distinction between general and specific jurisdiction, implying that in cases of specific jurisdiction, ie., when the
suit arises out of or is related to the defendant's contacts with the forum state, fewer contacts were necessary); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (defendant, an
Ohio corporation, could reasonably anticipate suit in a New York court on a libel action
based on the contents of its magazine, where defendant's magazine was circulated regularly
in that state); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum state must be such that he could reasonably anticipate being subject to suit in that state); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (defendant must have purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum
state's laws); S h d e r v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (abandoning the traditional approach
to determining in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, which allowed the presence of property
within the state to serve, without more, as a basis for exercising power over that property
and holding that all assertions of state power were to be measured by the due process standard set forth in International Shoe)..
136. See Asahi, 107 S.Ct a t 1035.
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targeted for New York.ls7 Thus, the foreseeability element, a key
one under the jurisdictional requirements of subparagraph (ii) of
CPLR 302(a)(3),lS8may be given as much effect as the statute envisions. Practitioners, however, should note that a t least one appellate division has held that a third-party defendant that manufactured a component part of a defendant's product is not subject to
jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii)lSemerely because the defendant sells its products in New York.140 In Martinez v. American
Standard,14' the Appellate Division, Second Department, concluded that there was no indication that the third-party defendant
knew or should have known that its customer was serving a New
York market.142The Second Department stated that in order to
meet the constitutional standards for an assertion of jurisdiction as
set forth in Hanson v. D e n ~ k l a and
l ~ ~ World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Wo~dson,"~it must be shown that the manufacturers
made a "discernible effort to serve, directly or indirectly, a market
within the forum state."14=This view seems to be a t odds with the
position of at least five justices of the current United States Supreme Court who lean toward a more expansive view of long-arm
j~risdiction.~'~
- -

137. See id.
138. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(3) ( M c K i e y Supp. 1988); see also infra note 146 and
accompanying text; Siegel, 329 N.Y.S.L.Dig. 4 (1987) (five justices stop short of rejecting the
stream of commerce theory).
139. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
140. See supra notes 123-37 and accompanying text.
141. 91 A.D.2d 652,457 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2d Dep't 1982), aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 873,458 N.E.2d
826, 470 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1983). Because there was no evidence showing that the component
part maker knew where the air conditioners were going or that it had tried to reach the New
York market through the compressor manufacturer, there was no purposeful availment necessary for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction. See Martinez, 91 A.D.2d a t 654, 457
N.Y.S.2d a t 99. In Asahi there was evidence enough to convince a t least five justices that
the component part maker knew its product was intended for California. See supra notes
103-12 and accompanying text. Compare Martinez v. American Standard, 91 A.D.2d 652,
457 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2d Dep't 1982) with Darienzo v. Wise Shoe Stores, Inc., 74 A.D.2d 342,472
N.Y.S.2d 831 (2d Dep't 1980) (where the Appellate Division, Second Department, reached a
diierent result). Both cases are discussed and applied in Montalbano v. Easco Hand Tools,
Inc., 766 F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 1985).
142. See Martinez, 91 A.D.2d a t 653-54, 457 N.Y.S.2d a t 99.
143. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
144. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
145. See Martinez, 91 A.D.2d a t 653-54, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
146. Justice Brennan's stream of commerce theory does not require the specific elements of foreseeability that the Second Department found to be necessary in Martinez. See
supra note 141 and accompanying text. The Brennan view, which seems to be the position
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Finally, the Asahi opinion alerts the practitioner to the importance of developing a detailed record for purposes of preventing a
dismissal on jurisdictional ground^."^ The factual record in Asahi
was sparse.148Consequently, the New York practitioner, faced with
a jurisdictional motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a) should insist on the "jurisdictional disclosure" provided for by subsection
(d) of CPLR 3211."9 In this respect it is important to note the
different standards for disclosure in state and federal practice. In
state courts, good faith conclusory allegations of jurisdiction present a "sufficient start" to entitle the plaintiff to disclosure on jurisdictional issues.160 In federal courts, the plaintiff must make a
prima facie showing of jurisdiction in order to proceed with
disc0~ery.l~~

of a majority of federal courts, is supported in Asahi by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and as modified by Stevens. Nonetheless the practicioner should note that New York's
state constitution has a due process clause which may require more than the federal counterpart. See Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 N.Y.2d 152,379 N.E.2d 1169,408 N.Y.S.2d
39 (1978).
147. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
148. See Asahi, 107 S. Ct. a t 1030. No discovery or traverse hearing was held in connection with the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; both sides merely submitted conflicting affidavits regarding foreseeability. See id.
149. See N.Y. CPLR 3211(d) (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1988). This section, entitled
"Facts unavailable to opposing party," provides that:
Should it appear from affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion made under
subdivision (a) or (b) that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot
then be stated, the court may deny the motion, allowing the moving party to assert
the objection in his responsive pleading, if any, or may order a continuance to permit further affidavits to be obtained or disclosure to be had and may make such
other order as may be just.
Id. Subdivision (d) is similar to Federal Rule 56(f) and is analogous to CPLR 3212(f). I t not
only protects the party to whom essential facts are not presently available, but also enables
the court before whom the motion is made to supervise disclosure. For a recent application
of CPLR 3211 (d), see Ramsey v. Mary Imogene Bassett Hospital, 113 A.D.2d 149, 495
N.Y.S.2d 282 (3d Dep't 1985) (holding that discovery was warranted); see also O'Connor v.
Bonanza Interior, 129 A.D.2d 569, 514 N.Y.S.2d 67 (2d Dep't 1987) (holding that CPLR
3211(d) should be used more often in jurisdictional disputes); WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,
supra note 86, a t 8 301.07 n.39 (citing Peterson v. Spartan Industries, Inc., 33 N.Y.2d 463,
467, 310 N.E.2d 513, 515, 354 N.Y.S.2d 905, 908 (1974), for proposition that the Court of
Appeals favors jurisdictional discovery).
KORN& MILLER,supra note 86, a t 8 301.07.
150. See WEINSTEIN,
151. See C. WRIGHT& A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 1069
(1969).
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B. Bases for Exercise of Jurisdiction
1. CPLR 301: General J u r i s d i ~ t i o n ' ~ ~

The traditional bases for the exercise of jurisdiction that developed prior to the adoption of the CPLR were incorporated into
it by CPLR 301.15s Thus, personal jurisdictions based on physical
presence,154domicile,166consent,156or "doing business"'57 permits
New York courts to assert jurisdiction over a defendant for any
cause of action irrespective of whether it arises from the defendant's contacts with New York.15'j
The "doing business" concept is frequently used to obtain ju.~~~
the Court of Aprisdiction over a foreign c o r p o r a t i ~ nAlthough
peals has stated that "[tlhe test for doing business is and should
be a simple pragmatic one . . ,"leOa review of the cases decided
during the Survey year indicates that the test, whiie pragmatic, is
far from simple. Four cases are worthy of comment. In Rolls-Royce
Motors, Inc. v. Charles Schmitt & Co.,161 Judge Leisure held that

.

152. See N.Y. CPLR 301 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
153. See id.
154. See id. Two exceptions should be noted: a person is not deemed present in New
York for purposes of process service when he was induced to enter by fraud, and he has
immunity from process when he appears voluntarily, as a plaintiff or defendant, to attend
proceedings involving criminal or civil litigation.
155. See N.Y. CPLR 313 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987) (New York domiciliary subject to in personam jurisdiction on any claim, wherever it arises, and wherever the defendant is located a t the time the summons is served).
156. See N.Y. CPLR 301 ( M c K i e y 1972 & Supp. 1988).
157. See Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917); Bryant v.
Finnish National Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 426,432, 208 N.E.2d 439,442,260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 628629 (1965); see also Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 N.Y.2d 305,310,434 N.E.2d 692,695,449 N.Y.S.2d
456, 458 (1982).
I t is the aggregate of the corporation's activities in the State such that it may be
said to be present in the sate' not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure
of permanence and continuity. . .and is the quality and nature of the corporation's
contacts with the State suilicient to make it reasonable and just according to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' that it be required to defend the
action here . . [citations omitted])
Laufer, 55 N.Y.2d a t 310, 434 N.E.2d a t 695, 449 N.Y.S.2d a t 458.
158. See Laufer, 55 N.Y.2d 305, 434 N.E.2d 692, 449 N.Y.S.2d 456.
159. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
160. See Bryant v. F i i s h National Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 432, 208 N.E.2d 439,442,
KORN&
260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 628-629 (1965). Cf. cases collected and discussed in WEINSTEIN,
MILLER,supra note 86, a t 5 301.16.
161. 657 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).

..
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Schmitt & Co., was not doing business in New York.ls2 The record
established that Schmitt spent millions of dollars purchasing cars
in New York and also spent substantial money on advertising.lss
Schmitt, the company president, visited New York every month
and the company had representatives in New York.ls4 Also, it sold
numerous cars in New York, held itself out as having a New York
location and conducted meetings in New York with representatives
of the plaintiff.le5 Nonetheless, Judge Leisure, in a fifty-one page
opinion, stressed the lack of "classic factors of section 301 jurisdiction"166 such as: (1) maintenance of a local office or bank account
in New York; (2) possession of property in New York; (3) a local
phone number; and (4) employees.167Judge Leisure explained that
the defendant's solicitation of business in New York plus its other
activities failed to support a finding that Schmitt Co. was doing
business in New York.les Relying on Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia v. Hall,16s Judge Leisure carefully analyzed each of the
defendant's New York contacts and concluded that most of its activities involved the purchase of goods and not the sale of goods.170
Furthermore, he reasoned that "purchasing activities" were of "relative unimportance" for jurisdictional purposes.171
In Bower v. Weisrnan,lT2Judge Sweet held that general jurisdiction could be asserted over a corporate defendant who had a
New York office, a bank account, elaborate standing reimbursement procedures for business promotion and an agent to manage

162. See Rolls Royce Motor, 657 F. Supp. a t 1040.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. a t 1044.
167. See id.
168. See id. "When considering this criteria, the facts presented by plaintiff fail to establish that Schmitt Co.'s presence in New York is sufficiently continuous and substantial to
warrant the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to 301." Id. a t 1050.
169. See id. a t 1045.
170. See id. (distinguishing between purchases of goods and services in New York and
the sale of goods and services in New York).
171. See id.;see also Standard Enterprises, Inc. v. Bag-It, Inc., No. 86-4508(S.D.N.Y.
1987) (classic factors for general jurisdiction not present); A.C.K. Sports, Inc. v. Doug Wilson Enterprises, 661 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same professional hockey player's appearance in New York seventeen times pursuant to his player contract with Illinois hockey
team did not qualify as doing business).
172. 650 F. Supp. 1415 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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its Manhattan fa~i1ity.l~~
The aggregate of these activities demonstrated that the defendant had "every indicia of a corporation 'doing business' in New Y ~ r k " Similarly,
'~~
in Amalgamet, Inc. u. Le~ ~ court
~
held that a New Jersey corporation was
doux & C O . , the
subject to general CPLR 301 jurisdiction primarily because it was
registered to do business in New York and maintained a New York
City telephone number.176Also, in American Dental Cooperative,
Inc. v. Attorney General,17? the Appellate Division, First Department, hinted in dicta that the "doing business" test can be satisfied without the maintenance of an office, bank account, employees,
General jurisdiction will exist if there is a "pattern of
systematic, regular and continuous contact"179within the State of
New York.
Finally, the practitioner should be reminded of the obvious.
General jurisdictional issues are crucial only when the plaintifPs
cause of action does not arise out of the contacts the defendant has
with the forum.lsOIn addition, while CPLR 301 jurisdictional issues often arise in diversity actions in federal court, the decisional
law of the forum state (New York) determines if a nonresident is
doing business.lsl
173. See Bower, 650 F. Supp. a t 1426.
174. See id.
175. 645 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
176. See Amalgamet, 645 F. Supp. a t 249 (foreign corporation which files a certificate
of authority to do business in New York has consented to personal jurisdiction in the state).
177. 127 A.D.2d 274, 514 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1st Dep't 1987).
178. See American Dental, 127 A.D.2d a t 280-81, 514 N.Y.S.2d a t 233.
179. See id. at 280, 514 N.Y.S.2d a t 233. In American Dental, the Attorney General
served a subpoena on the defendant, a Delaware corporation, which was not licensed to do
business in this state, alleging violation of New York's antitrust act; defendant, a purchasing
cooperative for an independently owned dental equipment and supply dealers, moved to
quash the subpoena on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction. See id. The court held
that under CPLR 301, a foreign corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction if i t is doing
business in New York, "not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence
and continuity." See id. (citing Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259,115 N.E. 915
(1917)). However, the court held that it need not reach the question of whether the defendant was "doing business" in New York since defendant may be subject to jurisdiction under
CPLR 302(a)(l). See id. Pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(l), a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary as to a cause of action arising out of the transaction of business within the state or the contracting anywhere to supply goods or services within the
state. See id.
180. See id.
181. See Amalgamet, Inc. v. Ledoux & Co., 645 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (when
subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, "the issue of personal jurisdiction is determined by the law of the fomm state, in this case New York."); see, e.g.,
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2. Long-Arm Jurisdiction

CPLR 3021e2 allows New York courts to assert jurisdiction
over nondomiciliary individuals and foreign corporation^'^^ not
subject to CPLR 301, but having the contacts with our state which
are listed in section 302.1a4This "long-arm" jurisdiction is limited
by the terms of CPLR 302 and by federal and state constitutional
considerationsle6 to claims that arise from the defendant's New
York related activity. This is the important distinition between
long-arm jurisdiction and jurisdiction based on presence, doing
business, consent or domicile, none of which is limited to causes of
action arising from New York related activities.ls6
Subsection (a) of CPLR 3021e7deals primarily with commercial and tort related litigation.ls8 It subjects defendants to jurisdiction for any cause of action "arising from" acts enumerated in the
statute which are committed by the defendant or his agent.lae The
exact scope of the agency is unclear.le0Several decisions during the
Survey year illustrate that before an agency relationship can be
held to exist under CPLR 302, a showing must be made that the
alleged agent acted in New York for the benefit of, with the knowledge and consent of, and under some control of the nonresident
principal.lel Other Survey year decisions make it clear that CPLR

Arrowsmith v. United Press International, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1963). Cf. A.C.K.
Sports, Inc. v. Doug Wilson Enterprises, 661 F. Supp. 386, 387 (1987). The same is true
when a federal courts subject matter jurisdiction is founded on the presence of federal questions. See Business Trends Analysts v. Freedonia Group, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 1452 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (citing United States v. F i s t Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 381 (1965); Metropa Co.
v. Choi, 458 F. Supp. 1052, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
182. See N.Y. CPLR 302 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
183. See Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281,288,200 N.E.2d 427,431,251
N.Y.S.2d 433, 438 (1964) ("although the section does not in terms refer to corporations, its
application to foreign corporations, as well as to non-resident individuals, seems clear.").
184. See N.Y. CPLR 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
185. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t 85-88 (citing Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45
N.Y.2d 152,379 N.E.2d 1169,408 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1978) (standing for the proposition that New
York Constitution has a due process clause which the Court of Appeals has held may require more than its federal counterpart); see also Svendsen v. Smith's Moving & Trucking
Co., 54 N.Y.2d 865, 429 N.E.2d 411, 444 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1981)(same).
186. See generally WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 86, a t $8 301-16.
187. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 86, a t $ 302.06.
191. See Adelona v. Webster, 654 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Barbera v. Smith, 654
F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Barrett v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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302 does not provide jurisdiction over a defendant in his individual
capacity based on an agents tortious act within the state unless the
agent was representing the defendant in his individual capacity.lSz
These cases indicate that while a formal agency relationship is unnecessary, courts will not liberally construe the term "agency" in
order to assert jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary defendant.lS3
Most of the long-arm cases during this Survey year deal primarily with the CPLR 302(a)(l) "transaction of business" clauselS4
and secondarily with CPLR 302(a)(3) which involves a tortious act
outside New York causing injury within it.lS6 The practitioner
should also be aware of the Court of Appeals decision in CPC International, Inc. v. McKesson Corp.ls6 where the Court qualified
the "fiduciary shield doctrine" discussed in last year's Survey.lS7
a. CPLR 302(a) (I): Transaction of Business ClauselSa

In the context of CPLR 302(a)(l),lSsthe transaction of business means purposeful activity in New York out of which a cause
of action arises.z00While a single act may constitute purposeful activity,201 several decisions during the Survey year confirm that the
term "transaction of business" is to be narrowly construedzoaand

'

192. See Lee v. Carlson, 645 F. Supp. 1430, 1434 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("There is no evidence, nor does the plaints allege, that any employee or tortfeasor a t the MCC was acting
as the personal rather than official agent of Carlson.").
193. See id. But see Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 122 A.D.2d 614,504 N.Y.S.2d 915
(4th Dep't 1986), lv. to appeal granted, 69 N.Y.2d 606 (1987) (to be discussed in next year's
Survey).
194. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
195. See N.Y. CPLR 302fa)(3)(ii) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
196. 70 N.Y.2d 268, 514 N.E.2d 116, 519 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1987).
197. See CPC Znt'l, 70 N.Y.2d a t 287-88, 514 N.E.2d a t 125-26, 519 N.Y.S.2d a t 814;
Carlisle, supra note 7, a t 92. Also the Court of Appeals is expected to repudiate the fiduciary shield doctrine prior to the date of the Survey's publication. See Kreutter v. McFadden
O
i
l Corp., 122 A.D.2d 614, 504 N.Y.S.2d 915 (4th Dep't 1986), lv. to appeal granted, 69
N.Y.2d 606 (1987) (to be discussed in next year's Survey).
198. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
199. See id.
200. In the context of CPLR 302(a)(l), the transaction of business involves purposeful
activity in the forum, perhaps only a single act out of which a cause of action arises. This
concept is to be distinguished from doing business which contemplates a whole complex of
activities as discussed in supra notes 153-81 and accompanying text.
201. See id.
202. See Standard Enterprises, Inc. v. Bag-It, Inc., 86-6746 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1987)
(telephone calls, invoices and one letter insufficient to establish jurisdiction under a
301(a)(l) analysis); ACK Sports, Inc. v. Doug Wilson Enterprises, 661 F. Supp. 386
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that the claim arising out of that activity must bear a substantial
relationship to it.20sThese cases support the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals' recent opinion in Fielder u. First City National Bank
~ ~ it was held that a nondomiciliary's two teleof H o ~ s t o n , 2where
pone calls and one mailing into New York did not constitute a
transaction of business.206The Second Circuit stated "we must
look at the totality of a defendant's contacts with the forum without regarding any single act as the sovereign talisman of jurisdict i ~ n . "The
~ ~ court
~
distinguished Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v.
Franklyn,207and C.T. Chemical (U.S.A), Inc. v. Houzens International, Inc.,208 on the grounds that in those cases the defendants
had used the telephonic link to New York as a means of projecting
themselves into local commerce.20BThe Second Circuit likened
Fiedler to the "order solicitation" cases which hold that telephone
orders not involving visits or consultations in New York do not
confer personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1).210Judge Sand
reached a similar conclusion in Metropolitan Air Service, Inc. v.

(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Illinois hockey player's meetings in locker rooms and restaurants in New
York with president of New York corporation did not qualify as a transaction of business
for assertion of in personam jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(l)); Talbot v. Johnson Newspaper Corp., 123 A.D.2d 147, 511 N.Y.S.2d 152 (3d Dep't 1987) (students attendance a t
college in New York does not constitute a transaction of business); see also Cooperstein v.
Pan-Oceanic Marine Inc., 124 A.D.2d 632,507 N.Y.S.2d 893 (2d Dep't 1986) (telephone calls
and mailing of loan papers to New York not enough to constitute a transaction of business).
203. See id.; see also In re Estate of Bruno, 126 A.D.2d 845,510 N.Y.S.2d 770 (3d Dep't
1987) (citing McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 272, 419 N.E.2d 321, 323, 437 N.Y.S.2d
643, 645 (1981) (for proposition that CPLR 302(a)(l) jurisdiction is not properly obtained
unless a substantial relationship between the claim and the transaction in New York is
established)).
204. 807 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying the "totality of the defendant's activities
within the forum" test).
205. See Fielder, 807 F.2d a t 317.
206. See id.
207. 26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.E.3d 506, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1970) (jurisdiction held proper
over a California resident who participated in a New York art auction via telephone link
with an agent of the auctioneer who then relayed defendant's bids).
208. 116 F.R.D. 518 (S.D.N.Y 1985) (defendant established a telephonic course of dealing with the plaintiff-seller and traveled to New York to have lunch with the seller in order
to discuss and negotiate the contract).
209. See id.
210. See Fielder, 807 F.2d 315; see also M. Katz & Son Billiard Products, Inc. v. G.
Correale & Sons, Inc., 20 N.Y.2d 903,232 N.E.2d 864,285 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1967); L. F. Rothschild, Unterberg, Towben v. McTammey, 89 A.D.2d 540,452 N.Y.S.2d 630 (19821, afd, 59
N.Y.2d 651, 449 N.E.2d 1275, 463 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1983).
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Penbestky Aircraft,211 where the court held that under New York
law a federal district court could not assert jurisdiction over an
out-of-state principal based on the plaintiff agency's activities
within the state when the principal's only contact with the agent
was by telephone and telex.212 Similarly, in Berk v. Nemetz2lSthe
federal district court held that the defendant's physical presence in
New York on one brief occasion did not constitute a transaction of
business?14 The court stated that "[a]lthough it is certainly true
that one of the most concrete manifestations of a nondomiciliary's
purposeful activity in New York occurs when he physically comes
to the state, it is hardly dispositive of the jurisdictional question
under 302."816
Additionally, the court considered the "number and duration"
of the defendant's visits to New York and the "purpose" of the
visits?16 Relying on McKee Electric Co. v. Rauland-Berg, Corp.,417
and George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz,218the court concluded that
a single trip by Nemetz to New York for a meeting with the plaintifF failed to satisfy the requirements under CPLR 302?lS
Once there has been a transaction of business, the claim must
arise out of it.220At least one appellate division during the Survey

211. See 648 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (reviewing New York State cases recognizing jurisdiction where defendant's physical presence in state is lacking and concluding that
jurisdictional assertions based on absent defendant require significant alternative contacts
which must constitute more than the exchange of telexes and telephone calls with a New
York plaintiff).
212. See id.
218. 646 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
214. See Berk, 646 F. Supp. a t 1084-85.
215. See id. a t 1084.
216. See id.
217. 20 N.Y.2d 377, 229 N.E.2d 604, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1967) (holding that defendant's
activities did not confer jurisdiction upon the court even though a t least three representatives of the defendant had made several visits to New York, each lasting several hours).
218. 41 N.Y.2d 648, 363 N.E.2d 551, 394 N.Y.S.2d &l4 (1977) (one visit to New York
enough for jurisdiction when it included interviewing, negotiating and contracting which
resulted in a continuing relationship with a New York corporation).
219. See Berk, 646 F. Supp. a t 1085. Contrast the court's decision in Berk with last
year's Survey discussion of Rates Technology, Inc. v. Diosio, 626 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D.N.Y.
1986), where the court upheld jurisdiction based on one meeting in New York. See Carlisle,
supra note 7, a t 91-92.
220. See WEINSTEIN,KORN& MILLER,supra note 86, a t § 302.02 (arising out of requirement usually not a problem when the action is for breach of contract negotiated in New
York; however, if a plaintiff's claim involves injury out of New York, the negligence action is
usually considered to be independent of any contract relationship between the parties).
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year has reminded the practitioner that personal jurisdiction is not
properly obtainable under CPLR 302(a)(l) "unless a substantial
relationship between the claim and the transaction in New York is
established."221Thus, in I n re Estate of
the Appellate
Division, Third Department, found that although the nondomiciliary respondent had made 18 or 20 visits to his dying sister at a
New York hospital, no relationship had been established between
his visits to the decedent and the petitioners

b. CPLR 302(a) (3)224
CPLR 302(a)(3)226provides for an assertion of jurisdiction if
the nondomiciliary commits an act out of state which causes injury
to a person or his property within the state and one or more of the
following conditions are met: (i) the defendant regularly does or
solicits business in New York, or derives substantial revenue from
goods used or services rendered here, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct here; or if these requirements are not
met, (ii) the nondomiciliary defendant could have reasonably foreseen the New York consequences and derives substantial revenue
from interstate or international commer~e.2~~
CPLR 302(a)(3)(i)227was analyzed during the Survey year in
. ~ ~ ~Weinfeld held that a government defendLee v. C a r l ~ o nJudge
ant did not fall within the "persistent course of conduct in the
state" prong of 302(a)(3)(i)229through the actions of his agents in
New York because they represented him in his official rather than
In Cleopatra Kohlique, Inc. v. New High
his individual

221. See In re Estate of Bruno, 126 A.D.2d 845, 510 N.Y.S.2d 770 (3d Dep't 1987).
222. See id.
223. See id. at 846, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 771. The claim concerned petitioner's right of election against a joint bank account in Pennsylvania in respondent's and decedent's names
with the right of survivorship. The appellate division stated: "No relationship has been established between respondent's visits to decedent and petitioner's claim. The joint account
predated respondent's visits. Accordingly, no long-arm jurisdiction was ever acquired in this
case!' Id. at 846-47, 510 N.Y.S.2d a t 772.
224. See Act of Sept. 1,1966, ch. 590, 1966 MCKINNEY'S
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 725 (codified at N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988)).
225. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
226. See id.
227. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(3)(i) ( M c K i e y 1972 & Supp. 1988).
228. 645 F. Supp. 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
229. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(3)(i) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
230. See Lee, 645 F. Supp. at 1434.
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Glass, Inc.,ZS1however, Judge Platt held that jurisdiction could be
asserted under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) when a manufacturer made a
fraudulent statement outside of New York that caused the plaintiff
buyer to lose some of its New York cu~tomers.2~~

C. Enforcement of a Foreign Judgment: Whose Law Determines Whether I n Personam Jurisdiction was Properly
Obtained
What happens if a New Yorker, who manufactures noodle
processing machines, receives a telephone call from the president
of an Arizona corporation who inquires about the availability of a
machine that would process an egg roll wrap and Oriental nooAssume the New Yorker says: "I will be in Phoenix to attend a trade show next month-we can meet there to discuss the
matter."2s4 The New Yorker goes to Phoenix and engages in preliminary negotiations for the sale of a "mini-noodle cutter."2s5 The
Arizona purchaser flies to New York to inspect the merchandise
and later the New Yorker sends a contract to him in Phoenix
which he signs and returns by mail to Manhattan with a check for
$8,000.2s6The New Yorker cashes the check, collects its proceeds,
and neglects to deliver the noodle cutter to Arizona.2s7Two weeks
later, after being served with a summons and complaint by registered mail,ZS8he hires you as his lawyer! Your detailed research
indicates that under New York law the Arizona courts do not have
a jurisdictional base.2s9If a default judgment is obtained in Ari~'~
zona will it be entitled to full faith and credit in New Y ~ r k ? Yes
sir!

231. 652 F. Supp. 1254 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
232. See Cleopatra Kohlique, 652 F. Supp. a t 1254.
233. These facts are taken from China Express, Inc. v. Volpi & Son Machine, 126
A.D.2d 239, 513 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1st Dep't 1987).
234. See id. a t 240, 513 N.Y.S.2d a t 388.
235. See id. a t 240, 513 N.Y.S.2d a t 389.
236. See id.
237. See id. a t 241, 513 N.Y.S.2d a t 389.
238. See id.
239. See Survey year cases discussed supra notes 202-232 and accompanying text (supporting a conclusion that there would be no jurisdictional base in New York).
240. When a default judgment is obtained in a sister state, the plaintiff can move under
CPLR 3213 for an accelerated judgment in lieu of complaint. If the courts of a sister state
had jurisdiction the default judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in New York. See
N.Y. CPLR 3213 (McKinney 1970).
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In China Express, Inc. v. Volpi & Son Machine, Corp.,2'l the
Appellate Division, First Department, held that where a sister
state's exercise of long-arm jurisdiction is challenged in an action
on a foreign judgment, the law of that state determines whether
jurisdiction was properly as~erted.2'~This is true even if that
state's long-arm statute is at odds with our r~le.2'~
New York, unlike many states, has not chosen to extend its long-arm jurisdiction
to the limits of constitutional tolerance?" Thus, if the long arm
statute of a sister state does not violate constitutional safeguards, a
default judgment rendered there can be enforced in New York.
China Express warns the practitioner of the obvious. If you want
to exercise your jurisdictional challenge and maintain your right to
a full hearing on the merits, "Go West Young Man" for the challenge. If you default, you can exercise your challenge in New York
but pursuant to the law of the foreign forum which will frequently
be more expansive than CPLR 302.245

D. Forum Non Conveniens
Even if a New York court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of an action and over the person of the defendant, the court
may decline to hear the case.246CPLR 327=" permits a court to
stay or dismiss any action if it finds that "in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in another forum."248

241. 126 A.D.2d 239, 513 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1st Dep't 1987).
242. See China Express, 126 A.D.2d a t 239, 513 N.Y.S.2d a t 388.
243. See ARIZ.R. CN. P. 4(e)(2). This Rule authorizes Ariiona courts to assert bases
over nonresident defendants who have "caused an event to occur in this state out of which
the claim which is the complaint arose." Id. This statute is simiiar to but obviously broader
than CPLR 302(a)(l) which provides for an assertion of bases over a nondomiciliary who
"transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in
the state." N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). Thus, if the Ariiona longarm statute does not violate state or federal due process requirements, then the default
judgment in China Express is realized. See Chiia Express, Inc. v. Volpi & Son Mach. Corp.,
126 A.D.2d 239, 513 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1st Dep't 1987).
244. See China Express, 126 A.D.2d a t 242, 513 N.Y.S.2d a t 389. "In that regard, we
should note that New York, unlike Arizona, has not chosen to extend its long-arm jurisdiction to the limits of constitutional tolerance." Id.
245. For examples of states, other than Ariiona, which have more expansive long-arm
M. KANE & A. MILLER,
CIVILPROCEDURE
139-47
statutes than New York, see J. MDENTHAL,
(1985).
246. See N.Y. CPLR 329 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
247. Id.
248. Id.
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Several Survey year opinions in this area demonstrate that our
courts are frequently applying the statutory doctrine of forum non
conveniens to dismiss c a ~ e s . 2 ~ ~
In Rappaport v. Rose Robert Travel Bureau, I ~ C . , ~ the
~ O plaint s , a New Jersey resident, was injured when struck by an automobile driven by her husband who was also a New Jersey resident.251
The accident occurred in the garage of their New Jersey home, and
a New Jersey police officer, who was called to the scene, investigated the circumstances surrounding the accident.262The only connections that the case had with New York were the following: the
automobile was owned by a New York corporation; the plaintiff
underwent orthopedic surgery in New York; and the plaintiff was
examined by a New York psy~hiatrist.2~~
The Appellate Division,
Second Department, relying on "all of the relevant factors,"264held
that the trial term properly exercised its discretion in granting the
defendant's motion for dismissal of the complaint pursuant to
CPLR 327.266The Court of Appeals, in Islamic Republic of Iran v.
P a h l a ~ i , 2listed
~ ~ the following factors for courts to consider when
ruling on a CPLR 327 motion: "the burden on the New York
courts, the potential hardship to the defendant, and the unavailability of an alternative forum in which the plaintiff may bring
The Court of Appeals further stated that a court may also
consider that both parties to the action are nonresidents and that
the transaction out of which the cause of action arose occurred primarily in a foreign jurisdiction.268

249. See Troni v. Banca Popolare Di Milano, 129 A.D.2d 502, 514 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1st
Dep't 1987); Rappaport v. Rose Robert Travel Bureau, Inc., 129 A.D.2d 620, 514 N.Y.S.2d
255 (2d Dep't 1987); VSL Corp. v. Dunes Hotel & Casinos, Inc., 128 A.D.2d 23,515 N.Y.S.2d
12 (1st Dep't 1987), reu'd, 70 N.Y.2d 948, 519 N.E.2d 617,524 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1988); see also
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cadillac Fairview US, Inc., 125 A.D.2d 181,508 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1st
Dep't 1986); Moezinia v. Moezinia, 124 A.D.2d 571, 507 N.Y.S.2d 716 (2d Dep't 1986);
Evdokias v. Oppenheimer, 123 A.D.2d 598, 506 N.Y.S.2d 883 (2d Dep't 1986).
250. 129 A.D.2d 620, 514 N.Y.S.2d 255 (2d Dep't 1987).
251. See Rappaport, 129 A.D.2d a t 621, 514 N.Y.S.2d a t 255.
252. See id., 514 N.Y.S.2d a t 255-56.
253. See id.
254. See id., 514 N.Y.S.2d a t 256 (citing Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d
474, 467 N.E.2d 245, 478 N.Y.2d 597 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985)).
255. See id., 514 N.Y.S.2d a t 255.
256. 62 N.Y.2d 474, 467 N.E.2d 245, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1984).
257. Pahlaui, 62 N.Y.2d a t 479, 467 N.E.2d a t 248, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t 600.
258. See id.; see also Silver v. Great Amer. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356,278 N.E.2d 619,328
N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972).
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Two appellate divisions have given trial courts broad latitude
when exercising their discretionary power under CPLR 327.269
Thus, in both Troni v. Banca Popolare di M i l a n ~ ~and
~ O Moezinia
v. M0ezinia,2~lthe fact that a party to the action resided in New
York State did not prevent the trial courts from granting the de~~
in VSL Corp.
fendants' CPLR 327 motions to d i s m i ~ s . 2Similarly,
v. Dunes Hotel and Casinos, I n ~ . , the
2 ~ ~Appellate Division, First
Department, held that the New York domicile or residence of a
party did not prevent the court from dismissing the plaintiFs
complaint sua sponte on the ground of forum non con~eniens.2~'
VSL Corp. is a case of first impression and suggests that appellate
courts will not hesitate to disregard the merits of a trial court's
decision2B6and sua sponte dismiss a case whenever appropriate
under the doctrine of forum non c0nveniens.2~"It should be noted,
however, that the Court of Appeals has rejected this approach and
---

- - --

--

259. See Troni v. Banca Popolare di Milano, 129 A.D.2d 502, 503, 514 N.Y.S.2d 246,
248 (1st Dep't 1987); Moezinia v. Moezinia, 124 A.D.2d 571,572,507 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (2d
Dep't 1986).
260. 129 A.D.2d 502, 514 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1st Dep't 1987). The appellate division held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint on forum non
conveniens grounds. See Troni, 129 A.D.2d a t 503,514 N.Y.S.2d a t 248. The trial court had
considered the burden on New York courts, the interest of an alternative forum in deciding
the issues, the need to translate documents from a foreign language, the need for interpretation of foreign law, and the fact that the lower court's dismissal permitted the plaintiff to
file his suit in Italy. See id. a t 503-04, 514 N.Y.S.2d a t 248.
261. 124 A.D.2d 571,507 N.Y.S.2d 716 (2d Dep't 1986). The appellate division &rmed
the trial court's order dismissing the complaint on forum non conveniens grounds. See
Moezinia, 124 A.D.2d a t 571,507 N.Y.S.2d a t 716. All the events complained of took place
in Iran. See id. a t 572,507 N.Y.S.2d a t 717. Also, a key witness resided in France, and the
plaintiff was a California resident. See id. Although the defendant resided in New York
State, the Second Department, relying on the factors set forth in Pahlavi, held that under
the totality of the circumstances a balancing of the equities did not favor the action being
heard in a New York court. See id.; see also supra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
262. See Troni, 129 A.D.2d a t 503, 514 N.Y.S.2d a t 247; Moezinia, 124 A.D.2d a t 572,
507 N.Y.S.2d a t 717.
263. 128 A.D.2d 23,515 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1st Dep't 1987), rev'd, 70 N.Y.2d 948,519 N.E.2d
617, 524 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1988).
264. See VSL Corp., 128 A.D.2d a t 26,515 N.Y.S.2d a t 14. The appellate division held
that an action by a California construction corporation against a New York parent corporation based upon a construction agreement with a Nevada subsidiary would be dismissed sua
sponte because the action had no substantial tie to New York. See id. a t 27,515 N.Y.S.2d a t
15.
265. See id. a t 25-26,515 N.Y.S.2d a t 14 (stating that "where, as here, an action which
has only minimal contact with the State is instituted in New York, the court is not obliged
to await the motion of counsel but may invoke the doctrine sua sponte.").
266. See id.
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reversed the First Department's decision in V S L C ~ r pIn. a~terse
~ ~
memorandum opinion the Court held that:
The Appellate Division acted outside of its authority in sua
sponte dismissing the complaint on forum non conveniens
grounds. Under CPLR 327(a) a court may stay or dismiss an action in whole or in part on forum non conveniens grounds only
upon the motion of a party; a court does not have the authority to
invoke the doctrine on its own motion?es

The Court of Appeals decision is questionable for obvious reasons.
Suppose lawyers in a sister state or foreign country come to New
York to litigate and by agreement do not raise forum non conveniens. New York courts may be overwhelmed with this type of
litigation.
Finally, the practitioner should note another important Sur~ United
vey year opinion. In Carlenstolpe v. Merck & C O . : ~the
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled for the first
time that a federal district court's order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint on forum non conveniens grounds is not an appealable order under 28 U.S.C. $ 1291.270Also, three Survey year
decisions by the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York confirm that, unlike state practice,e7l the availability of

267. See VSL Corp. v. Dunes Hotels & Casinos, Inc., 70 N.Y.2d 948, 519 N.E.2d 617,
524 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1988).
268. See id. a t 949, 519 N.E.2d a t 617, 524 N.Y.S.2d a t 671.
269. 819 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987).
270. See Carlenstolpe, 819 F.2d a t 36. The Third, Fifth, Sixth and District of Columbia
Circuits have also ruled that district court orders denying motions to dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds are nonappealable. See id. a t 33; see also Partrederiet Treasure Saga v.
Joy Mfg. Co., 804 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1986); Rosenstein v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
769 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1985); Nalls v. Rolls Royce, Ltd., Nos. 82-1975, 82-1976, 82-2033,
reh'g denied, 702 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 461 U.S. 970 (1983); Coastal Steel Corp.
v. Tilghman Wheelabrator, Ltd., 790 F.2d 190 (3d Ci.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983).
The Fourth Circuit, however, has ruled that a district court order denying a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds is appealable. See Kontoulas v. A.H. Robins co., 745
F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1984).
271. The New York State rule is set forth as follows:
Without doubt, the availability of another suitable forum is a most important factor
to be considered in ruling on a motion to dismiss but we have never held that it was
a prerequisite for applying the conveniens doctrine and in Varkonyi [Varkonyi v.
S.A. Empresa De Viacao Airea Reo Grandense (VARIG), 22 N.Y.2d 333, 338, 239
N.E.2d 542,544,239 N.Y.2d 670,673 (1968)J we expressly described the availabiIity
of an alternative forum as a 'pertinent factor', not as a precondition to dismissal. . ..
Nor should proof of the availability of another forum be required in all cases before
dismissal is permitted. That would place an undue burden on New York c0wt-s forc-
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an alternative forum is an absolute prerequisite for applying the
doctrine to dismiss a complaint in federal court.272

E. Statutory Requirements-Service

of Summons

Last year's Survey article reminded the practitioner that New
York State courts require strict compliance for service of summ o n ~ Decisional
. ~ ~ ~ law during the current Survey year warrants
that the admonition be repeated274because even the most minor
This
defect in service of a summons can be fatal to the
is true for the following reasons: one, a defect in service of the
summons dismisses the action;276two, the dismissal frequently occurs after the original statute of limitations has expired;277and finally, the six-month grace period under CPLR 205(a) does not apply to actions dismissed on jurisdictional g r o ~ n d s . 2 ~ ~
To avoid summons service challenges, the practitioner should
always debrief his or her process server. Also, if the defendant
raises a jurisdictional objection, serve a second summons and complaint for the same action. Let the defendant move to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that a prior action is pending. By doing
so he must admit that the first action is not jurisdictionally defectiveZTsWith the foregoing advice in mind, several Survey year notice decisions are worthy of note.280In addition, service of sum-

ing them to accept foreign-based actions unrelated to this State merely because a
more appropriate forum is unwilling or unable to accept jurisdiction. . . . Moreover,
even if we were to hold that the motion should be denied if no alternative forum is
.
available, then the burden of demonstrating that fact should fall on plaintiff.
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 481, 467 N.E.2d 245, 249, 478 N.Y.S.2d
597, 601 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985).
272. See Cruz v. Maritime Co. of Philippines, 655 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); ACLI
Int'l Commodity Serv., Inc. v. Banque Populaire Suisse, 652 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Hatzlachh Supply, Inc. v. Tradewind Airways, Ltd., 659 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
273. See Cariisle, supra note 7, a t 93-99. The practitioner should contrast the strict
compliance approach followed by New York State courts with the more liberal federal approach. See Romandette v. Weetabix, 807 F.2d 309, 311 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that Rule 4
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to be liberally construed to further the purpose of
finding personal jurisdiction in cases where the party has received actual notice).
274. See infra notes 286, 290, 297, 300-02, 313 and accompanying text.
275. See Siegel, Civil Procedure, 198 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, a t 9-24, col. 1.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id.; see also Yanni v. Chopp, 130 A.D.2d 489,515 N.Y.S.2d 72 (2d Dep't 1987).
280. See infra notes 286, 290, 297, 300-02, 313 and accompanying text.
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mons under the Hague Convention merits review.281
1. Service on a Natural Person

Delivery of the summons under CPLR 308(1)2szmay be accomplished by personally delivering it to the defendantza8or sometimes "by leaving it in the general vicinity of a person to be served
who resists service."284Two Survey year opinions, however, limit
the "general vicinity" exception.286 In Thermidor u. Wycoff
Heights H0spital,2~~
the plainti£F's process server delivered the
summons and complaint to the defendant doctor's secretary
outside of the defendant's presence.2s7 The Appellate Division,
2 ~ ~ that the serSecond Department, citing Macchia v. R ~ s s o , held
vice of summons was not properly effected and thus the trial court
lacked personal jurisdiction.28s The Second Department reached
the same result in Selby v. Jewish Memorial Hospitalzs0where delivery of the summons was made to a doctor's receptionist who had
stated that she was authorized to accept service.zs1The appellate
division held that it was not shown that "the papers were left in
the general vicinity of the defendant doctor" and that he was not
"made aware of the fact and manner of service."2sz The Second
Department also observed that service "could properly have been
effected pursuant to CPLR 308(2) by the mailing of a copy of the
summons and complaint to [defendant] at his residence."2ss

281. See infra notes 335-50 and accompanying text.
282. See N.Y. CPLR 308(1) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
283. See id.
284. Id.
285. See Thermidor v. Wyckoff Heights Hosp., 130 A.D.2d 653, 515 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2d
Dep't 1987); Selby v. Jewish Memorial Hosp., 130 A.D.2d 651, 515 N.Y.S.2d 580 (2d Dep't
1987).
286. 130 A.D.2d 653, 515 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2d Dep't 1987).
287. See Thermidor, 130 A.D.2d a t 653, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t 583.
288. 67 N.Y.2d 592,496 N.E.2d 680, 505 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1986) (where the Court of Appeals held that the delivery of a summons to the wrong penon does not confer jurisdiction
over a defendant even though he shortly thereafter receives it; a summons was delivered to
the defendant's son outside the family house, and the son entered the house and gave the
summons to the father).
289. See Therrnidor, 130 A.D.2d a t 653, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t 583.
290. 130 A.D.2d 651, 515 N.Y.S.2d 580 (2d Dep't 1987).
291. See Selby, 130 A.D.2d a t 651, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t 581.
292. Id. a t 652, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t 581.
293. Id., 515 N.Y.S.2d a t 581-82.
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2. Leave and Mail

CPLR 308(2)284permits service by leaving the papers with a
person of suitable age and discretion at the actual place of abode
of the defendant, and by mailing the summons to the defendant at
his last known address or, as an alternative, to his actual place of
b~siness."~~
If one of the two steps is omitted, the service is
invalid.gB6
The Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Raschel v. R i ~ h ~ ~ '
after last year's Survey article was submitted. In Raschel, the
court held that when more than one defendant is served in the
same action, by leaving the summons with a person of suitable age
and discretion, a separate copy must be left for each
Thus, if a single summons naming a doctor and hospital as defendants is delivered to a hospital administrator, then jurisdiction will
not be obtained over the defendant d o ~ t o r . 2 ~ ~
During the Survey year, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that substituted service on a person with adverse
interests to those of the respondent was not proper under CPLR
308(2).300Similarly, the Second Department held that a building
security guard was not authorized to accept service for a physician
who maintained an office in the building.301The Second Department also affirmed that neither the term "dwelling place" nor
"usual place of abode" may be equated with the "last known residence" of a defendant for purposes of substituted service under

294. N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
295. See id.
296. See id. It must also be noted that filing with the clerk of the court is necessary in
order to effectuate service. See id.
297. 69 N.Y.2d 694, 504 N.E.2d 389, 512 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1986).
298. See Raschel, 69 N.Y.2d a t 696-97, 504 N.E.2d a t 390, 512 N.Y.S.2d a t 24.
299. See id. (stating that although the administrator was qualied to accept service for
the defendant doctor under CPLR 308(2), actual notice depended on the following contingencies: the Administrator had to know that service was being made on the doctor as well as
on the hospital, had to notify the doctor, and had to furnish him with copies of the
documents).
300. See Community School Dist. No. 13 v. Goodman, 127 A.D.2d 830, 511 N.Y.S.2d
945 (2d Dep't 1987) (holding that the service of process upon respondent, by leaving papers
with the school superintendent, was improper in an article 78 proceeding brought by a
school district against an employee).
301. See Gottesman v. Lazansky, 127 A.D.2d 563, 511 N.Y.S.2d 643 (2d Dep't 1987).
The amendment to the CPLR 308(2) "cures the problems sharply raised" in this case. See
Barker, New York Practice, 198 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, a t 1, col. 1; see also infra notes
304-06.
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CPLR 308(2).302
Several other appellate decisions, holding that the mailing of a
summons to the defendant's place of employment is improper,go8
have been overruled by the Legislature's amendment to CPLR
308(2) which now permits the plaint8 to mail a copy of the summons to the defendant by first class mail to his actual place of
business.304This is an alternative to the "last known address" rule,
however, the mailing must be in an envelope marked "personal and
confidential."306 Also, the envelope may not indicate on the
outside, by return address or otherwise, that it is from an attorney
or relates to a legal action against the person served.306
3. Service on Defendant's Agent

CPLR 308(3)307permits service to be effected by delivery of
the summons to an "agent designated under Rule 318."308Effective
November 3, 1987, CPLR 318 was amended to provide that the
writing in which the principal appoints his agent must be executed
and acknowledged in the same manner as a deed.308
4. Nail and Mail

Last year's Survey warned the practitioner that service under
CPLR 308(4)310is unusually hazardous because it requires proof of
"due diligence" to make service under subsections (1) and (2) of
Section 308.311 While the "mail" requirements of CPLR 308(4)

302. See Chiari v. D'Angelo, 123 A.D.2d 655, 507 N.Y.S.2d 26 (2d Dep't 1986).
303. See Foley Machinery Co. v. Amaco Const. Corp., 126 A.D.2d 603,511 N.Y.S.2d 40
(2d Dep't 1987); Gottesman v. Lazansky, 127 A.D.2d 563,511 N.Y.S.2d 643 (2d Dep't 1987).
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 357-58
304. See Act of July 15,1987, ch. 115,s 1,1987 MCKINNEY'S
(codified a t N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney Supp. 1988)).
305. See N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
306. See id.; see also Barker, New York Practice, 198 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, a t 1,col.
1 (discussing the new provisions in CPLR 308(2) and (4) providing for mailing to the defendant's place of business).
307. See N.Y. CPLR 308(3) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
308. See id.; see also Gottesman v. Lazansky, 127 A.D.2d 563, 564, 511 N.Y.S.2d 643,
645 (2d Dep't 1987).
309. See Act of July 15, 1987, ch. 115,s 1,1987 MCKINNEY'S
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 357-58
(codified at N.Y. CPLR 308(3) (McKinney Supp. 1988)); see also Donaldson v. Melville, 124
A.D.2d 361, 507 N.Y.S.2d 301 (3d Dep't 1986) (agency must be express and not implied).
310. See N.Y. CPLR 308(4) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
311. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t 97-98; see also Farrell, Good Old Unreliable Service
Under New York's Nail and Mail Statute, 196 N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1986, a t 1, col. 1.
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have been expanded to include alternative mailing to the defendant's actual place of business,512 the due diligence requirements
continue to be rigidly construed. Thus, in Smith v. WilsonSISthe
Appellate Division, Third Department, held that substituted service under subsection (4) was improper where the process server
attempted to serve each of the two defendants on three separate
occasions, none of which were on a ~eekend.~"
The Third Department stated:
The fact that the instant case presents a close question on the
issue of due diligence was acknowledged by County Court when it
concluded that plaintiffs complied with the standard of due diligence, but 'barely'. On the one hand, Orloff did attempt to serve
each defendant a t home outside normal working hours on one occasion. On the other hand, a total of only three attempts at personal service were made with respect to each defendant, none of
these attempts was made on weekends and Orloff never made any
inquires to determine defendants' whereabouts or their possible
In light of the well-established policy
places of employment.
of strictly observing the due diligence requirement and of scrutinizing the quality of the efforts made a t personal service, we conclude that Orloff failed to exercise due diligence as a matter of

...

5. Expedient Service
Although CPLR 308(5)s16does not require proof of due diligence or of actual prior attempts to serve a party under each and
every method provided in CPLR 308,517 the practitioner should
continue to expect the "impracticable" requirements of subsection
(5) to be strictly construed.s18

312. See N.Y. CPLR 308(4) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
313. 130 A.D.2d 821, 515 N.Y.S.2d 146 (3d Dep't 1987)
314. See Smith, 130 A.D.2d at 822, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
315. Id.
316. See N.Y. CPLR 308(5) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
317. See id.
318. See Saulo v. Nourni, 119 A.D.2d 657, 501 N.Y.S.2d 95 (2d Dep't 1986) (expedient
service authorized because plaintiff had attempted to personally deliver the summons to the
defendant and thereafter made numerous inquiries as to his whereabouts).
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6. Related Service Tips

CPLR 31231s was amended to permit service on a board or
commission of a town or village by delivering the summons to the
clerk of the town or village.320Also, New York City's in rem foreclosure notice procedures do not require that a property owner receive personal notice of an in rem foreclosure unless the owner files
a registration card with the New York City Department of Fin a n ~ e . ~During
~ l the Survey year the Appellate Divisions for the
First and Second Departments have issued conflicting decisions regarding the constitutionality of these notice requirements.82eAlso,
the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, has held a similar procedure violates due process.s2s Leave to appeal has been granted
for review of the Second Department's position.324Service under
New York Vehicle and TrafEc Law, section 253,925is not obtained
by serving a summons on the Secretary of State if the plaintiff fails
to include the defendant's out-of-state address.s26Also, service is
proper when a defendant is served within a courthouse, and therefore does not deprive a court of jurisdiction over housing owners

319. See N.Y. CPLR 312 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 338
320. See Act of June 8, 1987, ch. 109, 1 1, 1987 MCKINNEY'S
(codified a t N.Y. CPLR 312 (McKinney Supp. 1988)).
321. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code $3 11-406, 11-417.
322. See Alliance Property Management & Dev., Inc. v. Andrews Ave. Equities, Inc.,
133 A.D.2d 30, 518 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 831, 517 N.E.2d 1327, 523
N.Y.S.2d 441 (1987) (affirming solely on the procedural grounds that the appellate division
had the power to award the relief granted and the Court ruled on no other issues). The First
Department voided these same notice requirements and found that publication notice to an
unregistered property owner whose whereabouts were nevertheless readily ascertainable did
not satisfy due process because the city had an obligation to give personal notice to all
interested parties and not merely to those who requested such notice by filing registration
cards. See id. a t 31,518 N.Y.S.2d a t 508; see ako In re Tax Foreclosure No. 35,127 A.D.2d
220, 227, 514 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (2d Dep't 1987) (where the city acquired title to some land
in Staten Island through an in rem foreclosure, and the property owner did not receive
personal notice of the proceeding because he had failed to register with the city; publication
notice in the City Record satisfied due process because the owner had waived his right to
personal notice of the sale by failing to 6le a registration card).
323. See East River Savings Bank v. Cerullo Motors, Inc., 134 Misc. 2d 699, 512
N.Y.S.2d 327 (Erie County Ct. 1987); see ako In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by Erie
County (Mfr. & Traders Trust Co.), 103 A.D.2d 636,481 N.Y.S.2d 547 (4th Dep't 1984).
324. See In re Tax Foreclosure No. 35,199 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 13,1988, a t 15, col. 1;see ako
In re Tref Realty Co., 199 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 1988, a t 17, col. 3.
325. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW3 253 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988).
326. See Adirondack Transit Lines, Inc. v. Lapazlia, 128 A.D.2d 228, 515 N.Y.S.2d 668
(3d Dep't 1987).
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served while in housing maintenance code proceedings.327
Finally, a criminal contempt proceeding can be commenced by
substituted service instead of personal delivery.328In an issue of
apparent first impression, the Appellate Term, First Department,
held that personal service under CPLR 308(2)329was a sufficient
jurisdictional predicate for criminal contempt.330The appellate
term noted that there was no appellate case expressly holding that
personal delivery of an order to show cause was the only permissible means of initiating a criminal contempt matter, or that statutory alternatives to in-hand delivery were jurisdictionally infirmed.331 Although personal delivery of process is always
preferable, "due process does not require it in a special proceeding
. . . as long as the party charged is notified of the accusation and is
afforded a reasonable time to defend."332Another case of apparent
first impression is Cascone v. B r e n n ~ where
n ~ ~ ~the Bronx County
Civil Court determined that it had jurisdiction over a fifteen-yearold child defendant in a tort action even though service of process
was made on his guardian father.334
7. The Hague Convention

First, count the number of automobiles in New York State
with foreign license plates. Second, count the number of actions
filed in New York State courts during the Survey year where a

327. See Department of Housing Preservation & Dev. v. Koenigsberg, 133 Misc. 2d 893,
509 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1986). In a thoughtful opinion, Housing Judge
Lewis R. Friedman held that valid reservice of process on the owners conferred jurisdiction
notwithstanding the pendency of motions alleging defective original service. See id. a t 896,
509 N.Y.S.2d a t 272. Judge Friedman also held that the respondent owners were not immune from reservice while in court contesting the original service. See id. a t 897-98, 509
N.Y.S.2d at 273.
328. See Department of Housing Preservation & Dev. v. 24 West 132 Equities, Inc., No.
86-92738 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. Dec. 8, 1987).
329. See N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
330. See Department of Housing Preservation & Dev. v. 24 West 132 Equities, Inc., No.
86-92738 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. Dec. 8, 1987). The practitioner should also note that
personal delivery is not necessary for imposition of civil contempt. See Lu v. Betancourt,
116 A.D.2d 492, 496 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1st Dep't 1986) (personal delivery of an order to show
cause is not necessary for civil contempt sanctions).
331. See Department of Housing Preservation & Dev. v. 24 West 132 Equities, Inc., No.
86-92738 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. Dec. 8, 1987).
332. See id.
333. 134 Misc. 2d 417, 511 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., Bronx Co. 1987).
334. See Cmcone, 134 Misc. 2d at 418, 511 N.Y.S.2d a t 502.
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defendant was a foreign national. Third, count the number of lawyers you know who have of copy of the Hague Convention. Fourth,
if your answer to any of the preceding inquiries is more than one,
read this section of the Survey carefully.
If a defendant in any action is a citizen of a country that is a
signatory to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extra Judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, an international treaty known as the Hague Convention,ss6then watch
out! You may be required to make special efforts to comply with
the Convention's service requirements.ss6The Hague Convention is
purportedly designed to "simplify service of process abroad so as
to ensure that documents are brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient time."ss7 The treaty allows signatory nations
to ratify it subject to conditions or objections.s38If a signatory nation has made any objections that would affect the method of service on its citizens or corporations, the New York lawyer should be
aware of them,sS9particularly because two Survey year decisions
reach conflicting results on how service of summons is accomplished under the Hague Conventi~n.~'~

335. See 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, reprinted in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, a t 104-08
(West Supp. 1987)[hereinafter The Hague Convention].
336. See id.
337. Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 431 F. Supp. 1226,1228 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd,
565 F.2d 1194 (7th Ci. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978).
338. See The Hague Convention, supra note 335, a t 105. Article 10 of the Hague Convention provides:
Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not
interfere with a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad,
b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the
State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial
officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination.
c)the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to effect service
of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination.
Id.
339. See Russell v. Arthur Trask Co., 125 A.D.2d 136, 139, 512 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578 (3d
Dep't 1987) (stating that it should be apparent from the trial record if the signatory State
had made any objections t o The Hague Convention); see also Reynolds v. Koh, 109 A.D.2d
97,99,490 N.Y.S.2d 295,297 (3d Dep't 1985) ("Japan objected 'to the use of the methods of
service referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of article 10,' but not to the provision of
article 10.").
340. See Rissew v. Yamaha ,Motor Co., 129 A.D.2d 94, 515 N.Y.S.2d 352 (4th Dep't
1987); Russell v. Arthur Trask Co., 125 A.D.2d 136, 139, 512 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578 (3d Dep't
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In Rissew v. Yamaha Motor CO.,~'' the Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, held that service of process on a Japanese corporation by mail pursuant to New York Business Corporation Law,
section 307,5'= was permissible under the Hague Con~ention.~'~
The Fourth Department, in Rissew, declined to follow a contrary
holding by the Third Department found in Reynolds u. Ko~.~''
During this Survey year, the Third Department followed Reynolds
in Russell v. Arthur Trask C O . ~although
'~
the court required that

1987).
341. 129 A.D.2d 94, 515 N.Y.S.2d 352 (4th Dep't 1987).
342. See N.Y. Bus. CORP.LAW$ 307 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988).
343. See Rissew, 129 A.D.2d a t 98-99, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t 355. Plaintiff served defendant
a t its corporate headquarters in Japan pursuant to New York Business Corporation Law
section 307. See id. a t 96, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t 353. He delivered a copy of the summons and
complaint to the New York Secretary of State and mailed a copy to the defendant. See id.
Ultimately, the plaint8 effected service under article 10 of the Hague Convention by sending copies to the Japanese Miistry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, but service was made after
the applicable four-year statute of limitations under UCC section 2-275(1) had run. See id.
a t 96, 515 N.Y.S.2d 353-54. The issue was whether New York Business Corporation Law,
section 307 service was authorized under The Hague Convention. See id. a t 97,515 N.Y.S.2d
a t 354. The Fourth Department held that article 10(a) of the Convention permitted such
service. See id. a t 98,515 N.Y.S.2d a t 355. The court rested its decision on its interpretation
of the purpose of the Hague Convention, which was "to simplify service of process abroad so
as to ensure that documents are brought to the notice of addressee in suEicient time." See
id. at 97-98, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t 354. The Fourth Department also observed that Japan, although objecting to subdivision (b) and (c) of Article 10, never objected to subdivision (a).
See id. a t 98, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t 354.
344. See id. (citing Reynolds v. Koh, 109 A.D.2d 97,490 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dep't 1985)).
In Reynolds, the plaintiffs brought a tort action against several defendants, including Nissan Motor Company who had manufactured the auto that plaintiffs were driving when they
were injured in the auto accident. See Reynolds, 109 A.D.2d a t 98, 490 N.Y.S.2d a t 296.
Plaintiffs served Nissan with an amended summons and complaint by registered mail, and
delivered a copy to the New York Secretary of State under Business Corporation Law section 307. See id. Although the process was received, Nissan argued that service was still
ineffective because plaintiffs had failed to serve them through the Japanese Minister for
Foreign Affairs, as required by The Hague Convention. See id.,490 N.Y.S.2d a t 296-97. The
Third Department held that service under New York Business Corporation Law section 307
was defective. See id. a t 99, 490 N.Y.S.2d a t 297. The court held that the word "send"
rather than the words "serve or service" in article 10(a) did not authorize service, and concluded that because the plaintiffs had not satisfied the service requirements of The Hague
Convention there was no jurisdiction over Nissan. See id. a t 99-100,490 N.Y.S.2d a t 296-98.
The appellate division stated that the law of Japan was incompatible with the law of New
York, which provides for direct service by one litigant upon another, because under Japanese law service is the courts' responsibility. See id. a t 100, 490 N.Y.S.2d a t 298
345. 125 A.D.2d 136, 512 N.Y.S.2d 575 (3d Dep't 1987) (following Reynolds , but remanding the case for further development of the record on question of whether Italy had
made any objection to the Hague Convention that would affect the method of service on its
citizens or corporations). On remand the third party defendant was served in accordance
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the record before the trial court show whether the signatory state
had made any objections to the Hague Convention that would effect service of
Until the split in authority is clarified by the Court of Appeals, why gamble? Lawyers should rely on the Third Department's restrictive interpretation of the Hague Convention found in
Reynolds.347Xerox a copy of the Convention articles from the
United States Code Annotated, and check to be sure if service of
process by postal channels is permitted under article 10(a).848If
there is any doubt, then follow article 5 to determine if the service
law of the foreign jurisdiction is compatible with the law of New
Y ~ r k The
. ~ ~practitioner
~
should also be alert to the "interplay"
between rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Hague Convention, because several federal district courts in New
York have reached conflicting conclusions as to whether service
can be made on a foreign national pursuant to rule 4.360The conflicting approaches to the Hague Convention, on the state and federal levels, will have to be clarified by the New York Court of Appeals and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. Until then, the practitioner should "double check" when
making service of process on a foreign national.s61
IV. STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS
Of the many Survey year decisions interpreting and applying
article I1 of the CPLR, the following should be of selective interest
to the practitioner.

with the Hague Convention. See Telephone interview with Professor Jay C. Carlisle and
Robin Bartlett Phelan, Counsel for Arthur Trask Company (Dec. 21, 1987).
346. See Russell, 125 A.D.2d a t 139, 512 N.Y.S.2d a t 577.
347. See supra note 344-46 and accompanying text.
348. See The Hague Convention, supra note 335, a t 105.
349. See id.
350. See Silverberg, Civil Practice Roundup I n Southern District, 198 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 3,
1987, at 1, col. 1, (citing Lana Mora Inc. v. S.S. Woermann Ulanga, 672 F. Supp. 125
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that the Hague Convention "provides merely a mechanism for servicing process which is otherwise authorized, and is not an independent federal authorization for service abroad.")). But see Cargill, Inc. v. M N Paschalis, No. 86-0805 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30,1987) (holding that mail service outside the United States is not permitted by Rule
4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
351. See supra notes 337-50 and accompanying text.
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A. Section 203(b)(5): Delivery to Sheriff or County Clerk

The most common method of interposing a claim is by serving
the summons upon the defendant.362Another method is by delivering the summons to the sheriff of an appropriate county for service
upon the defendant.363When the action will be tried within the
City of New York, the summons must be filed with the clerk of a
specified county.364This provision is useful when the applicable
limitations period is about to run and the defendant cannot be located or served quickly because it extends the time period within
which the defendant must be served by sixty days.366
Traditionally, New York courts have liberally interpreted the
service and filing requirements of CPLR 203(b)(5),566but several
decisions during the Survey year suggest that the statute is being
more restrictively interpreted.367In Petrone v. S.S.K.S. Restaurant
C O ~ ~ the
. , JAppellate
~~
Division, Second Department, held that the
plaintiffs application for a preference, which resulted in the summons ending up in the files of the county clerk, was not a filing for
purposes of CPLR 203 (b).368The same appellate division held in
another case that the plaintws failure to file papers in the county
listed on the summons as being the defendant's address prevented
the 60-day tolling provision from taking effect.360The Second De352. See N.Y. CPLR 203(b)(l) ( M c K i e y 1972 & Supp. 1988).
353. See N.Y. CPLR 203(b)(5) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
5 47 (Supp. 1987) A summons is not filed
354. See id.; D. SIEGEL,NEWYORKPRACTICE.
with the clerk of the county where the action will be brought, but with the clerk of the
county where the individual or corporate defendant resides. See N.Y. CPLR 203(b)(5) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). The county in which the claim arose is an alternative but only
if the plaintiff cannot determine with due diligence where the individual defendant resides.
See id. The corporate defendant may be served in the county of its residence, in the county
where it does business, or where the cause of action arose. See id.
355. See N.Y. CPLR 203(b)(5) (McKiney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
356. See id.
357. See Bellamund v. Beth Israel Hosp., 131 A.D.2d 796, 517 N.Y.S.2d 161 (2d Dep't
1987); Petrone v. S.S.K.S. Restaurant Corp., 125 A.D.2d 654, 510 N.Y.S.2d 178 (2d Dep't
1986); Nelson v. Downstate Medical Center, 135 Misc. 2d 980, 517 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct.,
Kings Co. 1987); see also Raschel v. Riih, 69 N.Y.2d 694, 504 N.E.2d 389, 512 N.Y.S.2d 22
(1986).
358. 125 A.D.2d 654, 510 N.Y.S.2d 178 (2d Dep't 1986).
359. See Petrone, 125 A.D.2d a t 655-56, 510 N.Y.S.2d a t 179.
360. See Bellamund v. Beth Israel Hosp., 131 A.D.2d 796, 517 N.Y.S.2d 161 (2d Dep't
1987). But see Woll v. R d a , 124 A.D.2d 726, 508 N.Y.S.2d 474 (2d Dep't 1986) (where the
court rejected appellant's contentions that CPLR 203(b)(5) was not operable because appellant's actual place of residence and business was in Kings County and plaintiff had filed the
summons and complaint in Queens County, because the plaintiff fulfilled the purpose of the
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partment stated that "[slince CPLR 203(b)(5) requires, inter alia,
that the summons be filed in the county in which the defendant
'resides, is employed or doing business,' the plaintiffs failure to file
the summons in New York County prevented the statutory 60-day
tolling provision from taking effect."s61
The Kings County Supreme Court also held, in Nelson v.
Downstate Medical Center,SB2that the plaintiff must make a "reasonable inquiry" as to where the defendant resides, and that it is
not enough to check the yellow pages under "physicians."sBS In
that case, the plaintiff should have used an investigator or telephoned the attorneys for the defendants to ascertain their
whereabo~ts.~~'
Finally, in a related matter the Court of Appeals held in Raschel v. Rish,SB6that the statute of limitations was not tolled as
against a doctor by service on a hospital in the absence of a showing that the hospital and doctor were united in interest by evidence of the doctor's employment rather than his mere affiliation
with the hospital.sB6

B. Section 203(e): The Relation Back DoctrineSB7
During last year's Survey year the appellate divisions liberally

statute by filing the papers in the county of defendant's last known place of business after
making reasonable inquiry to determine his actual whereabouts).
361. Bellamund, 131 A.D.2d a t 797, 517 N.Y.S.2d a t 162.
362. 135 Misc. 2d 980, 517 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1987).
363. See Nelson, 135 Misc. 2d a t 986, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
364. See id. (stating that "CPLR 203 subd.(b) par. 5 requires reasonable inquiry not
minimal inquiry.").
365. 69 N.Y.2d 694, 504 N.E.2d a t 389, 512 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1986).
366. See Raschel, 69 N.Y.2d a t 697, 504 N.E.2d a t 390-91,512 N.Y.S.2d a t 23-4. "Here,
however, there was no showing of the doctor's employment by the hospital, nor was there
any showing that plaintiff had sought care directly from the hospital rather than from the
doctor himself." Id., 504 N.E.2d a t 391,512 N.Y.S.2d a t 24. The Court of Appeals held that
service of one copy of the summons and complaint upon the hospital was not sufiicient
absent a showing that the administrator knew that he was accepting service on behalf of the
doctor and had reason to notify him of the same. See id. a t 696-97,504 N.E.2d a t 390,512
N.Y.S.2d a t 23; see also Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Liidauer, 135 Misc. 2d 132,
513 A.D.2d 629 (Sup. Ct., Cattaraugus Co. 1987) (holding that the wife was not "united in
interest" with her co-borrower husband in respect to the bank's action on a credit card and,
therefore, could assert a defense of statute of limitations in a later action for summary judgment when she was not sewed in the first matter).
367. N.Y. CPLR 203(e) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988)
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construed CPLR 203(e)36sto permit amendment of pleadings. Although most of this year's Survey decisions permit amendments in
general,36s courts have been reluctant to allow the addition of
claims that would otherwise be barred by the statute of limita~~~
t i o n ~For
. ~ example,
~~
in Laudico u. Sears, Roebuck and C O . , the
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held that a wife's loss of
services claim could not be allowed to relate back to the earlier
pleading that asserted her husband's claim.372Similarly, in Clark v.
Turner Construction
the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that an employee could not amend her claim to al-

368. See id. (providing that added claims in amendments permitted by leave of court
are timely unless the original claim did not give notice of the transactions or occurrences to
be proved).
369. See Cutwright v. Central Brooklyn Urban Dev. Corp., 127 A.D.2d 731, 512
N.Y.S.2d 128 (2d Dep't 1987) (leave to amend granted by the appellate division in a fraud
action); Getz v. Getz, 130 A.D.2d 710,516 N.Y.S.2d 26 (2d Dep't 1987) (leave granted in a
matrimonial action); Hopper v. Hise, 131 A.D.2d 814, 517 N.Y.S.2d 178 (2d Dep't 1987)
(leave granted in a dental malpractice action); Shepherd v. New York City Transit Auth.,
129 A.D.2d 574,514 N.Y.S.2d 72 (2d Dep't 1987) (leave granted in a personal injury action);
McKinney v. Bay Ridge Medical Group, 126 A.D.2d 711,511 N.Y.S.2d 123 (2d Dep't 1987)
(leave granted in a medical malpractice action); Stephan v. Shulman, 130 A.D.2d 484, 515
N.Y.S.2d 67 (2d Dep't 1987) (leave granted in an action seeking accounting of partnership
profits); Powe v. City of Albany, 130 A.D.2d 484, 514 N.Y.S.2d 725 (3d Dep't 1987) (leave
granted to assert statute of limitations as a defense in an action to recover damages for the
demolition of a building); Nab-Tenn Constructors v. City of New York, 123 A.D.2d 571,507
N.Y.S.2d 146 (1st Dep't 1986) (motion to amend denied but without prejudice).
370. See Laudico v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 125 A.D.2d 960,510 N.Y.S.2d 787 (4th Dep't
1986); Clark v. Turner Constr. Co., 130 A.D.2d 454, 515 N.Y.S.2d 33 (2d Dep't 1987);
Zavetta v. Portelli, 127 A.D.2d 760,512 N.Y.S.2d 152 (2d Dep't 1987); see akro Thompson v.
Pittman, 123 A.D.2d 683, 506 N.Y.S.2d 979 (2d Dep't 1986) (where the original pleadings
did not give notice of the claims sought to be added by amendment, the new complaint was
time barred); Shairo v. Schoninger, 122 A.D.2d 38, 504 N.Y.S.2d 199 (2d Dep't 1986) (no
notice in original pleadings bars complaint). But see State v. St. James Nursing Home, 128
A.D.2d 694,513 N.Y.S.2d 195 (2d Dep't 1987) (where the original complaint notified defendants that the State's claims were based on certain financial reports, the court permitted the
claims asserted in the amended complaint that were based on the same reports).
371. 125 A.D.2d 960, 510 N.Y.S.2d 787 (4th Dep't 1986). After filing the note of issue
and statement of readiness, p l a i n t s moved to add his wife as a party plaintiff together with
her cause of action for loss of services. See Laudico, 125 A.D.2d a t 960,510 N.Y.S.2d a t 787.
The appellate division held that hi wife's cause of action was time-barred when plaintiff
sought to amend and the trial court properly denied his request. See id. a t 961, 510
N.Y.S.2d a t 788. The court held that pursuant to CPLR 203(e) the cause of action would
not relate back to the time the action was commenced on the grounds that the wife was not
a prior participant in the action, and the prior pleadings gave defendants no notice that the
wife would be asserting a claim. See id.
372. See id. at 961, 510 N.Y.S.2d a t 787.
373. 130 A.D.2d 454, 515 N.Y.S.2d 33 (2d Dep't 1987).
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lege that she lost control of her vehicle and sustained further injuries because of injuries resulting from the original accident.s74Also,
in Zaveta v. P ~ r t e l l i , Sthe
~ ~Second Department held that CPLR
203(e) did not apply to save the plaintiffs claim asserted against a
third-party defendant after the expiration of the applicable statute
of limitations.s76This was true even though the third-party defendant had received notice of the circumstances underlying plaintiffs proposed amended claim prior to expiration of the statute of
limitations.s77 The message is clear; don't expect to use CPLR
203(e) to revive a dead claim unless you can definitely show that
the amendment will not prejudice your adversary.s78

C. CPLR 214-a: Exceptions to the General Rules78
Medical, dental, and podiatric malpractice actions are governed by CPLR 214-asB0which requires actions to be brought
within two years and six months of the act or omission at issue.981
This year's exception cases include those involving the discovery of
~~
foreign objects,SB2the continuous treatment d o ~ t r i n e , 9fraudulent
c0ncealrnent,9~~
and equitable estoppel.s86
At least one appellate court agrees with last year's Survey,

374. See Clark, 130 A.D.2d a t 455,515 N.Y.S.2d 33 (where the motion for leave to serve
further amended complaint was made nearly three years after the injuries were sustained).
375. 127 A.D.2d 760, 512 N.Y.S.2d 152 (2d Dep't 1987).
376. See Zaveta, 127 A.D.2d a t 761, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 153 (stating that even where a
third-party defendant receives notice of the circumstances surrounding p1aint-s claim,
contained in the amended complaint, prior to expiration of the applicable statute of limitations by a third-party action against it, plaintiff is not allowed to circumvent the time bar).
377. See id. a t 761, 512 N.Y.S.2d a t 154 (stating that although CPLR 1009 permits a
plaintiff to amend his complaint without leave of court to assert any claim that the plaintiff
has against a thud party defendant, this provision does not relieve a plaintiff from the operation of the statute of limitations).
8 237 (1978).
378. See D. SIEGEL,NEW YORKPRACTICE
379. N.Y. CPLR 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1988).
380. Id.
381. See id.
382. See Mitchell v. Abitol, 130 A.D.2d 906, 515 N.Y.S.2d 810 (2d Dep't 1987); Sternberg v. Gardstein, 120 A.D.2d 93, 508 N.Y.S.2d 14 (2d Dep't 1986).
383. See Bobrow v. DePaulo, 655 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Malavenda v. New
York Telephone Co., 127 A.D.2d 452, 512 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1st Dep't 1987); Fox v. Glens Falls
Hosp., 129 A.D.2d 955, 515 N.Y.S.2d 118 (3d Dep't 1987).
384. See Szajna v. Rand, 131 A.D.2d 840,517 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't 1987).
385. See Ettore I. v. Angela D., 127 A.D.2d 6, 513 N.Y.S.2d 733 (2d Dep't 1987);
Thompson v. Whitestone Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 131 A.D.2d 749, 516 N.Y.S.2d 963 (2d Dep't
1987).
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which suggested that intrauterine devices ("IUDs") qualify in some
trial courts for the foreign object exception rule.3s6In Sternberg v.
Gard~tein:~? the Appellate Division, Second Department, held
that an IUD became or took on the character of a foreign object
when the defendant performed an abortion and tubal ligation sterilization procedure but negligently failed to remove the IUD.S8s
The plaintiffs medical malpractice action therefore accrued when
the IUD was or could reasonably have been discovered by the patient.38DIn Mitchell v. Abit01,3~Ohowever, the Second Department
held that a medical malpractice claim based solely on an allegation
that a wrong suturing method and material were used did not
bring the action within the ambit of the foreign exception rule.391
The continuous treatment doctrine continues to be restrictively applied by New York Courts.392In Fox v. Glens Falls Hospita1,3g3the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that a patient's return to the hospital emergency room five days after her

386. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t 104 n.344.
387. 120 A.D.2d 93,508 N.Y.S.2d 14 (2d Dep't 1986). The Second Department deserves
kudos for this thoughtful opinion. In November of 1979, an IUD was inserted into plaintiff
by a nonparty physician. See Sternberg, 120 A.D.2d a t 94,508 N.Y.S.2d a t 15. On February
13, 1981, defendant agreed to perform an abortion on the plaintiff and to remove the IUD.
See id. During the operation on March 2, 1981, defendant did not remove the IUD. See id.
On November 1, 1983, plaintiff commenced a personal injury action to recover damages
caused by the IUD which defendant negligently failed to remove. See id. a t 95,508 N.Y.S.2d
a t 15. Defendant sought a dismissal on the grounds that the action was barred by CPLR
214-a and argued that the foreign object exception did not apply. See id. The appellate
division held that the exception was applicable and that the plaintws malpractice claims
accrued on the date she discovered or should have discovered the IUD. See id. a t 97, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 17.
388. See id. The appellate division noted that i t had previously held that the failure of
a physician to remove an IUD upon the implantation of a second IUD was a "fact pattern
appropriate for the application of the foreign object rule set forth in CPLR 214-a." Id. a t 95,
508 N.Y.S.2d at 16, (citing Darragh v. County of Nassau, 63 A.D.2d 1010,405 N.Y.S.2d 1020
(2d Dep't 19781, aff'g,91 Misc. 2d 53, 397 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1977)). The
appellate division then concluded that the Darragh decision was indistinguishable from the
Sternberg fact pattern for "while the defendant did not insert a second IUD, he did provide
an alternative means of contraception." Id. a t 97, 508 N.Y.S.2d a t 16..
389. See id. a t 97, 508 N.Y.S.2d a t 17.
390. 130 A.D.2d 633, 515 N.Y.S.2d 810 (2d Dep't 1987).
391. See Mitchell, 130 A.D.2d a t 633-34, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t 810-11 (holding that the suture material was a "fixation device placed intentionally within the body" and could not
therefore be considered a foreign object, citing Goldsmith v. Howmedica, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d
120, 491 N.E.2d 1097, 500 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1986)).
392. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t 103 (stating that courts during the 1986 Survey year
restrictively read CPLR 214-a when applying the continuous treatment doctrine).
393. 129 A.D.2d 955, 515 N.Y.S.2d 118 (3d Dep't 1987).
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initial discharge was continuous treatment.s94The court, however,
held that her subsequent return to the hospital nearly two and
one-half years later constituted a resumption of treatment rather
than a continuation thereof.s96Similarly, in Bobrow v. DePaulo,Bm
Judge ,Leval held that independent checkups for detection of
breast cancer did not constitute a continuous course of treatment
and could not be linked together to toll the statute of limitat i o n ~ Also,
. ~ ~ in
~ Malavenda v. New York Telephone Co.,BBBthe
Appellate Division, First Department, held that CPLR 214-a could
not be tolled because the plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of
showing that the defendant was more than an independent
~ontra~tor.~~~
The doctrines of fraudulent concealment and equitable estoppel are applied by courts to prevent a defendant from raising a
time bar if it would be inequitable for the defendant to do so.'OO
They cannot be applied, as a matter of law, unless a plaintiff is
able to establish the necessary elements for the assertion of each
doctrine.'O1 In Szajna u. Rand,'02 the AppeIIate Division, Second
Department held that because the record before the trial court
contained disputed allegations pertaining to the issue of fraudulent
concealment, an award of summary judgment would be inappropriate.'Os In Thompson v. Whitestone Sav. & Loan Ass~ciation,'~~
the

394. See Fox, 129 A.D.2d a t 956, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t 120.
395. See id., 515 N.Y.S.2d a t 119 (stating that the "continuous nature of a diagnoses
does not itself amount to continuous treatment.").
396. 655 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
397. See Bobrow, 655 F. Supp. a t 687. (stating that the continuous treatment requires
more than merely a continuous physician-patient relationship).
398. 127 A.D.2d 542, 512 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1st Dep't 1987).
399. See Malavenda, 127 A.D.2d a t 543,512 N.Y.S.2d a t 111. An employee brought an
action against a radiologist who had read mammograms in connection with the employer's
breast screening program. See id. The appellate division held that the statute of limitations
was not tolled absent a showing that the radiologist was more than an independent contractor. See id.
400. See infra notes 406-07 and accompanying text.
401. See Ettore I. v. Angela D., 127 A.D.2d 6,513 N.Y.S.2d 733 (2d Dep't 1987); Szajna
v. Rand, 131 A.D.2d 840,517 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't 1987); Thompson v. Whitestone Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 131 A.D.2d 749, 516 N.Y.S.2d 963 (2d Dep't 1987).
402. 131 A.D.2d 840, 517 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't 1987)
403. See Szajna, 131 A.D.2d a t 841,517 N.Y.S.2d a t 202 (stating that the "plaintiff has
raised triable issues of fact as to whether the Statute of Limitations should be tolled by
virtue of the defendants' fraudulent concealment of plaintiffs injuries and the plaintiffs
consequent reliance upon his representations and advice").
404. 131 A.D.2d 749, 516 N.Y.S.2d 963 (2d Dep't 1987).
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Second Department concluded that the trial court properly refused
to apply the doctrine because the plaintiffs failed to establish the
necessary elements of equitable estoppel?06
Thus, parties wishing to assert these doctrines should follow
the lead of the Court of Appeal's decision in Simcuski v. Saeli.'Q6
An estoppel argument must state facts upon which there is a factual dispute as to whether the defendant's acts, however innocent,
were reasonably relied upon by the plaintiff who did not sue until
the otherwise applicable time period had run.'07 For fraudulent
concealment, the plaintiff must prove that he justifiably relied
upon the defendant's intentional misrepresentation and then prosecute the claim with due diligence after learning of the
c~ncealment.'~~

D. CPLR 217: When is a Four-Month Time Period
Appli~able?'~~
Last year's Survey discussed, for the first time, some of the
1986 decisions interpreting CPLR 217.'1° This provision set a fourmonth time limitation in a proceeding against a body or officer after the determination becomes binding or final upon the petitioner."' Several appellate division opinions during the Survey
year demonstrate that there continues to be confusion on both the
bar and the bench as to when the period is applicable and when it
begins to run.(12 In Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. City of Alb~ny,"~

405. See Thompson, 131 A.D.2d a t 750,516 N.Y.S.2d a t 965; see also Green v. Abbott
Laboratories, 198 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1987, a t 17, col. 2 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.) (rejecting the
plaintiffs arguments that the DES manufacturers should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations where the industry allegedly concealed facts about the link
between their product and cancer, but plaintiff had not specified the allegedly concealed
facts and had not presented evidence of any manufacturer's wrongful acts).
406. 44 N.Y.2d 442, 377 N.E.2d 713, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1978).
407. See Simcuski, 44 N.Y.2d a t 449, 377 N.E.2d a t 716,406 N.Y.S.2d a t 262.
408. See id. a t 451, 377 N.E.2d a t 718, 406 N.Y.S.2d a t 264.
409. See N.Y. CPLR 217 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
410. See Carlisle, supra note 7, at 104-05.
411. See id.; see also N.Y. CPLR 217 (McKiney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
412. See Burrell v. Ortiz, 128 A.D.2d 391,512 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1st Dep't 1987);Dionisio v.
Board of Educ., 128 A.D.2d 524,512 N.Y.S.2d 458 (2d Dep't 1987); Waterside Assoc. v. New
York State Dep't of Environmental Conservation, 127 A.D.2d 663, 511 N.Y.S.2d 890 (2d
Dep't 1987); People ex rel. Mianda v. Kuhlman, 127 A.D.2d 924, 511 N.Y.S.2d 981 (3d
Dep't 1987); Vasbiner v. Hartnett, 129 A.D.2d 894,514 N.Y.S.2d 530 (3d Dep't 1987); Kurland v. McLaughlin, 122 A.D.2d 947,505 N.Y.S.2d 967 (2d Dep't 1986); see also Calvest v.
Westchester Co. Personnel Office, 128 A.D.2d 523, 512 N.Y.S.2d 456 (2d Dep't 1987) (ad-
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the Court of Appeals held the enactment of a city ordinance to be
administrative and not legislative."' The four-month statute under
article 78(16 was applied, therefore, and not the six-year provision
applicable to declaratory judgments or injunction^.'"^ It is often
difficult to determine what sort of remedy to pursue, therefore,
particularly when a citizen perceives a municipal wrong. One commentator suggests that serious thought be given to making article
78(17 the only remedy available against a government body for
challenged actions.'l8

E. CPLR 214-c: Revivor Statute Challenged41s
Last year's Survey discussed the revival of time-barred claims
in cases of exposure to DES, tungsten-carbide, asbestos, chlordane,
and polyvinyl chloride.'*O The one year revival period has ex-

ministrative determination becomes final and binding under CPLR 217 on the date it becomes effective); Bardou v. Town of North Dansville, 134 Misc. 2d 927, 513 N.Y.S.2d 584
(Sup. Ct., Livingston Co. 1987) (date upon which applications of town for urban development action grant became final is the date upon which the applications were executed by
the town supervisors).
413. 70 N.Y.2d 193, 512 N.E.2d 526, 518 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1987).
414. See Save the Pine Bush, 70 N.Y.2d a t 204-05,512 N.E.2d a t 530,518 N.Y.S.2d a t
947.
415. N.Y. CPLR 7801-06 (McKinney Supp. 1988)
416. See id.; see ako People ex rel. Miranda v. Kuhlmann, 127 A.D.2d 924, 511
N.Y.S.2d 981 (3d Dep't 1987). In Miranda, the petitioner instituted a habeas corpus proceeding seeking an immediate release from prison. See Miranda, 127 A.D.2d a t 926, 511
N.Y.S.2d a t 983. The supreme court converted the proceeding to an article 78 proceeding
and dismissed it on the ground that it was time-barred. See id. a t 927,511 N.Y.S.2d a t 983.
A disciplinary determination made in 1972 resulted in the loss to petitioner of 180 days of
good time and in 1986, the time allowance committee effectuated the loss of such time thus
prolonging petitioner's period of incarceration. See id. a t 928, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 984. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus; the appellate division &rmed the lower
court, holding that a collateral attack on the disciplinary determination which had resulted
in petitioner's loss of good time must be obtained by way of an article 78 proceeding, and is
thus subject to the four-month limitation period of CPLR 217. See id. a t 927, 511 N.Y.S.2d
a t 983. The court further stated that language in the governing regulations that a loss of
good time is tentative until the recommended loss affects consideration for parole or conditional release, does not render the 1972 disciplinary determination non-final. See id. a t 928,
511 N.Y.S.2d a t 984.
417. See N.Y. CPLR 7801-06 ( M c K i e y 1981 & Supp. 1988).
418. See Barker, New York Practice, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, a t 1, col. 1.
419. See N.Y. CPLR 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1988).
420. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t 69-74 (discussing newly enacted CPLR 214-c and
warning the practitioner to expect the constitutionality of the revivor statute to be
challenged).
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~ i r e d . ' Constitutional
~~
challenges to the statute, however, were
made during the Survey year.'22
In Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Company423a state supreme
court justice upheld the constitutionality of CPLR 214-~.'~(The
defendants had challenged the revival statute on equal protection
and due process grounds arguing that the statute was the result of
an arbitrary and irrational political arrangement without rational
guidelines, scientific certainty, or public ne~essity.'~~
The defendants also argued that the legislative concern for limiting the number of potential claimants and costs was not related to the objective of the legislation, which was to allow victims of latent injuries
to maintain actions.(26 One defendant contended, furthermore,
that before the constitutionality of the revival statute could be determined, further discovery was necessary on the question of
whether or not such extraordinary circumstances existed to justify
invocation of the ~tatute.'~?In a well-reasoned opinion, Justice
Gammerman held that the revival statute had a reasonable relationship with the legislative purpose of providing "a forum for innocent victims who might otherwise be time-barred before becomAccording to the court:
ing aware of their injurie~."'~~
As a general rule, state statutes of limitation reviving time barred
actions are not violative of due process. Statutes of limitation re-

421. Id. The one-year period began running on July 30,1986. See Act of July 30,1986,
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1567 (codified a t N.Y. CPLR 214-c (McKinney
ch. 682,1986 MCKINNEY'S
1987)); see also Piccirelli v. Johns Manville Sales Corp. 128 A.D.2d 762, 513 N.Y.S.2d 469
(2d Dep't 1987). In this action alleging negligence and strict products liability, plaintiff
sought to recover damages for injuries resulting to his exposure to asbestos. See Piccirelli,
128 A.D.2d a t 762, 513 N.Y.S.2d a t 469. The Appellate Division, Second Department, held
that the action, which was time barred as of July 30, 1986, was revived pursuant to the
provisions of chapter 682. See id. a t 763,513 N.Y.S.2d a t 470; see also Act of July 30,1986,
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1565 (codified a t N.Y. CPLR 5041-49 (McKinch. 682,1986 MCKINNEY'S
ney 1987)). Plaintiffs last exposure to the asbestos was 14 years prior to the commencement
of the action. See Piccirelli, 128 A.D.2d a t 762, 512 N.Y.S.2d a t 469.
422. The principal challenge is Hymowitz v. Eli L i y & Co., 136 Misc. 2d 482, 518
N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1987). It should also be noted that on the same day the
Hymowitz decision was issued, the same court upheld plaintiffs' cause of action despite their
inabilities to identify which DES products caused the injuries. See Tigue v. E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc., No. M-4231, slip op. (1st Dep't Dec. 1, 1987).
423. 136 Misc. 2d 482, 518 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1987).
424. See N.Y. CPLR 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1987)
425. See Hymowitz, 136 Miic. 2d a t 493, 518 N.Y.S.2d a t 1002.
426. See id. a t 4&1, 518 N.Y.S.2d a t 998.
427. See id. a t 485, 518 N.Y.S.2d a t 999.
428. Id. a t 486, 518 N.Y.S.2d a t 1000.
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present a public policy statement with respect to the privilege to
litigate. [Tlhe history of pleas of limitations shows them to be
good only by legislative grace and to subject to a relatively large
degree of legislative control. Chase Securities Corp. v.Donaldson,
325 U.S. 304, 314 (1944). The expiration of the applicable time
period does not eliminate a cause of action but rather, suspends
the court's power to grant a remedy. In other words, statutes of
limitations relate to the availability of a remedy and not to the
destruction of any fundamental right.'2B

On appeal to the Appellate Division, First Department, the
appellants made three fundamental challenges to the revival stat~te:'~Ofirst, that the reopener is, on its face, an unconstitutional
exercise of legislative power;4s1 second, that it is unconstitutional
as applied to any claim that the plaintiff could have brought under
the old statute of limitations but chose not to bring;4s2and finally,
that section 12,'ss which deprives the defendant manufacturers of
the five targeted substances of the benefit of CPLR article 16,"s4is
an unconstitutional discrimination against those companies.4s6I t is
highly likely that the appellate division will uphold the constitutionality of the revivor statute and also uphold the theory that
drug manufacturers are liable even though they are not identified
as the makers of the specific pills taken by the plaintiff.
In a related matter,'sB a state supreme court justice refused to
expand the one-year revival statute to include actions for wrongful
death that were viable a t the time of the decedent's death.4s7
While acknowledging that "the legislative design may work an injustice in this case,"4s8Justice Gammerman ruled that "it would be

429. Id. a t 485, 518 N.Y.S.2d a t 999.
430. See Brief of Defendant Eli Lilly & Co. (Preliminary Statement) (copy on file at
Syracuse Law Review, Syracuse Univ. College of Law).
431. See id.
432. See id.
433. See id.;see also N.Y. CPLR 1201-11 (McKinney Supp. 1988)
434. See Brief of Defendant Eli L i y & Co. (Preliminary Statement); see also N.Y.
CPLR 1601-03 (McKinney Supp. 1988)
435. See supra note 430 and accompanying text. This argument is based on the fact
that revision of the rules of joint liability do not pertain to suits revived under CPLR 214~ ( 4 )See
. Act of July 30, 1986, ch. 682, 1986 MCKINNEY'S
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1567 (codified
a t N.Y. CPLR 214-c (McKinney 1987)).
436. See Green v. Abbott Laboratories, 198 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1987, a t 13, col. 2 (Sup.
Ct., N.Y. Co.).
437. See id.
438. See id.
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improper to judicially extend the revival provisions as it relates to
wrongful death claims."4SgJustice Gammerman also rejected the
plaintifF's arguments that the DES manufacturers should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitation^."^ It
should be noted that a supreme court justice has refused to permit
defendants in a products liability action pending for almost ten
and
~ ' win dismisyears to take advantage of newly enacted 2 1 4 - ~ ~
sal of claims based upon a new discovery rule pertaining to injuries
caused by exposure to harmful substance^.'^^

F. Miscellaneous
During the Survey year, some other decisions emerged that
merit at least brief mention.
1. Federal Night Depository Box: General Rule l(a) for the

Southern District
In Greenwood v. State of New York Office Of Mental
Health,"= a psychiatrist brought a federal civil rights action
against the State of New Yorkfi4 The claim was subject to the
three-year statute of limitations for general personal injury
~laims."~Federal procedural rules require that district courts be
deemed open for filing pleadings twenty-four hours each dayF6
Judge Leisure held that the plaintifF's action was not "commenced" for limitations purposes on the date his complaint was
placed in a night depository box maintained by the clerk of the
Instead, placement was only effective to commence the action on the following day by which time the action was time
barred!448Judge Leisure based his decision on General Rule l(a) of
the Southern District of New York which provides that papers

439. Id.
440. See id.
441. N.Y. CPLR 214-c (McKinney 1987).
442. See O'Halloran v. Toledo Scales, Co.,
A.D.2d
524 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1st Dep't
1988), aff'g, 135 Miic. 2d 1098,517 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1987) (the action was
not controlled by the new and liberalized statute of limitations period).
443. 645 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
444. See Greenwood, 645 F. Supp. at 113.
445. See id. at 115.
446. FED.R CIV.P. 77(a).
447. See Greenwood, 645 F. Supp. at 114.
448. See id.

-

-
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submitted after business hours in the night depository box will be
considered to have been filed as of 8:30 a.m. the following business
day."9 This decision is on appeal and should be reversed by the
Second Circuit.
2. CPLR 215(3): As Applied by Federal Courts460

In Von Bulow By Auersperg v. Von B u l ~ w , ' ~Judge
l
Walker
held that a malicious prosecution action arising out of criminal
proceedings in Rhode Island was barred by CPLR 215(3).'5e Judge
Walker noted that the action should have been brought within one
year from the date on which the claim first accrued.'5s Since a malicious prosecution action first accrues after a plaintiff receives a
favorable final determination in the prior legal proceeding, the
date it was rendered forms the basis of the a~tion.'~'Judge Walker
reminded the practitioner that federal courts applying New York
State law should also apply New York's statute of limitations
provi~ion.'~~
3. Toll by Reason of Insanity

One result of the appellate divisions' power to make factual
determinations is that it can reverse the trial court and find a person "insane" under CPLR 208466for the purposes of tolling a statute of limitation^.'^' The test is whether a person is "unable to
manage his business affairs and estate and to comprehend and protect his own legal rights and liabilities because of an overall ability

449. See id. Judge Leisure found that rule 77(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
does not specify the date on which papers should be considered filed if deposited a t the
courthouse after regular hours. See id. a t 113. He also reasoned that the drafters of the
federal rules intended rule 77 to be read in conjunction with General Rule l(a) of the Southern District. See id. a t 116. Greenwood is on appeal before the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit (86-7926). Your author predicts that the Second Circuit will reverse and
remand the case to the district court prior to the Survey's publication.
450. See N.Y. CPLR 215(3) (McKinney 1972).
451. 657 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
452. See Von Bulow, 657 F.Supp. a t 1136 (citing N.Y. CPLR 215(3) (McKiney 1972)).
453. See id. at 1138.
454. See id.
455. Id. a t 1138 (citing Stafford v. International Harvester, 668 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir.
1981)); see akio Bank of Boston v. Argue110 Tefel, 626 F. Supp. 314, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
456. N.Y. CPLR 208 (McKiney Supp. 1988).
457. See Yannon v. R.C.A., 131 A.D.2d 843, 517 N.Y.S.2d 205 (2d Dep't 1987).
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to function in society."46s

4. Notice of Claim Provisions
Some limitations of time are not true statutes of limitations,
but are in actuality conditions precedent. They require the plaintiff to do an act other than commencing the action prior to the
expiration of a stated period of time.'69 When the required act is
the filing of a notice of claim, the plaints must plead and prove
Because there is no
compliance with the condition pre~edent.'~~
comprehensive compilation of conditions precedent a~ailable,'~'
the practitioner must ascertain in each case whether one applies.
When one does, the practitioner should be aware that there will be
an applicable statute of limitations in addition to the notice requirement.'62 In this respect, the New York Court of Appeals has
held that the notice of claim requirement of General Municipal
Law 50-e46sapplies to a federal civil rights claim, whether the
claim is based on section 1981464or 1983466of the United States
Code. Although Survey year decisions by at least two appellate di-

458. Id. a t 845, 517 N.Y.S.2d a t 206-07.
459. See, e.g., Becker v. City of New York, 131 A.D.2d 413,516 N.Y.S.2d 225 (2d Dep't
1987) (the plaintiff had to allege that the city commissioner of transportation had received
written notice of a pothole).
460. See id.; see also Halperin v. City of New York, 127 A.D.2d 461, 511 N.Y.S.2d 273
(1st Dep't 1987) (plaintiff had to prove prior knowledge of an inoperative tr&c signal).
461. Perry Pazer, a former president of the New York State Trial Lawyers Association,
states there are nearly 400 applicable time limitations between notices of claim and various
statutes of limitations in New York State. See N.Y.S.T.L.A. Bill of Particulars (Sept.-Oct.
1987). He also refers the practitioner to a listing prepared by attorney Bert Bauman of
statutes of limitations significant to the New York City area. See id.
462. In an action against the City of New York, for example, a notice of claim must be
filed within 90 days, N.Y. GEN.MUN.LAW50(e) (McKinney 1986), while a summons in a
personal injury action must be filed within one year and 90 days, and a summons for wrongful death within two years. See N.Y. EPTL 5-5.1 (McKinney 1987). The same time periods
apply in actions against the Transit Authority and the New York City Health and Hospitals, except wrongful death actions for the latter two must be filed within one year and 90
days for the Transit Authority. See id.; see also N.Y. PUB.AUTH.LAW$ 1212 (McKinney
1987). Practitioners would be well advised to join the New York State Trial Lawyers' Association and obtain a copy of Bert Bauman's statutes of limitations list.
463. See N.Y. GEN.MUN.LAW3 50(e) ( M c K i e y 1986).
464. See Mills v. County of Monroe, 59 N.Y.2d 307,451 N.E.2d 456,464 N.Y.S.2d 709
(1983); see also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617 (1987).
465. See 423 S.Salina S t , Inc. v. City of Syracuse, 68 N.Y.2d 474, 503 N.E.2d 63, 510
N.Y.S.2d 507 (1986).
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visions466and one federal district
demonstrate that courts
are liberally construing notice of claim requirements, the practitioner should be careful to comply with them.'6s

5. Federal Superfund Amendment
Last year's Survey mentioned the Superfund and
Reauthorization Act of 1986.469The Act establishes an accrual rule
for claims brought under state law for damages from exposure to
any hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant released into
the en~ironrnent.'?~The federal statute governs many actions
brought after December 11,1980."' It should be noted that important limitations in the coverage of the Superfund Amendment are
found in the Act's definitions se~tion.'?~
6. Statute of Limitations: Extension In Actions Against Non-

domiciliary Corporations
On November 2, 1987, the United States Supreme Court
agreed to decide whether a state may extend its statute of limitations to allow suits that would otherwise be untimely against outof-state corporation^.'^^ The case grew out of a contract with a
chemical plant in Ohio, and is limited to the extent that corporations have avoided subjecting themselves to the state's jurisdiction
before the normal limitations period has run.'?'

466. See Halperin v. City of New York, 127 A.D.2d 461, 511 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1st Dep't
1987); Becker v. City of NewYork, 131 A.D.2d 413, 516 N.Y.S.2d 225 (2d Dep't 1987).
467. See Piesco v. City of New York Dep't of Personnel, 650 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
468. See generally, D. SXEGEL,NEWYORKPRACTICE3 35 (Supp. 1987).
469. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t 72 n.29 (citing Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)).
470. See id.
471. See 42 U.S.C. 9 9658 (1982)
472. See id. "Relevant release into environment" is defined to exclude emissions from
engine exhausts of motor vehicles and aircraft release of federally regulated nuclear material
and the common application of fertilizer. See 42 U.S.C. 9 9601(2) (1982). In addition exposure to products intended for consumer use are excluded. See id.
473. See Bendix Autolite, Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, 820 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1987),
cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3320 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1987) (No. 87-367).
474. See id.
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The practitioner knows the importance of motion practice
under CPLR 3211475and 3212476.Your author often wonders, in
fact, if the Survey piece should be entitled "Motion Practice" with
designated subdivisions relating to jurisdiction, statute of limitations, res judicata, etc. Instead, he continues the Survey tradition
of integrating article 31 and 32 cases into other subject areas.'??
The number of CPLR 3211 and 3212 cases decided by New
York State courts during the Survey year is impres~ive.'?~The
most important one is a short memorandum opinion by the Court
of Appeals in Addesso v. Shemt~b.'?~Professor Siegel has already
analyzed the Addesso case twice.'80 It is important, however, to remind the practitioner of the obvious. Defendants seeking to take
advantage of jurisdictional challenges must rigidly abide by the requirements of CPLR 3211(e).'81 If a motion is made, it is important to include jurisdiction as a ground. If an answer is interposed
without making a motion, be certain to include the jurisdictional
objection in it. As Professor Siegel states, the Court of Appeals is
"warning the bar to stop being careless with the subject of
jurisdi~tion."'~~
Additional Survey year motion practice cases which are worthy of mention include Yanni v. C h ~ p p , 'Montgomery
~~
Ward Co.
v. 0thmer,'84 and Jeraci v. Froehli~h."~~
In Yanni, the Appellate
Division, Second Department, held that where counsel for the de-

475. N.Y. CPLR 3211 (McKinney 1987) (motion to dismiss).
476. N.Y. CPLR 3212 (McKinney 1987) (motion for summary judgment).
477. Your author is always grateful for advice and suggestions made by Survey readers.
A good number of my New York Practice students insist that the course should be renamed
Motion Practice Under the CPLR as well.
478. See WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 86, a t art. 32 (Supp. 1987).
479. 70 N.Y.2d 689,512 N.E.2d 314, 518 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1987). Plaintiff filed complaint
and defendant moved to dismiss it for failure to state a cause of action. See Addesso, 70
N.Y.2d a t 690,512 N.E.2d a t 315,518 N.Y.S.2d a t 794. Plaintiff amended complaint to cure
the defect and defendant then raised a jurisdictional objection to serve in his amended answer. See id. The Court of Appeals held that objection should have been raised in the f i s t
motion. See id.
480. See Siegel, Civil Practice, 198 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, a t 23-24, col. 1; see also
Stein, New York Court of Appeals Roundup, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 10, 1987, a t 1, col. 1.
481. N.Y. CPLR 3211(e) (McKinney 1987).
482. Siegel, Civil Practice, 198 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, a t 24, col. 1.
483. 130 A.D.2d 489, 515 N.Y.S.2d 72 (2d Dep't 1987).
484. 127 A.D.2d 913, 512 N.Y.S.2d 273 (3d Dep't 1987).
485. 129 A.D.2d 557, 514 N.Y.S.2d 53 (2d Dep't 1987).
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fendants conceded validity of service of process in a request for
dismissal of an action in a second county, defendants were equitably estopped from contesting jurisdiction or raising the defense of
statute of limitations in an action filed in the first county.'86 In
Montgomery Ward, the Appellate Division, Third Department,
held that two lawsuits emanating from a common transactional occurrence is not in and of itself enough to dismiss the state court
action on the ground that another claim is pending between the
In Jeraci,
parties for the same cause of action in federal
the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the defendant's claim that he had never received responses to discovery demands was not sufficient to rebut the presumption flowing from
facially proper &davits to service by
The practitioner should also be alerted to a split of authority
on the notice required before a motion under CPLR 3211(a)489can
be converted to a motion for summary judgment. The Appellate
Division, First Department, has held that the notice must come
from the court.'@O The Second Department, on the other hand,
concludes that the notice may come from one of the parties in the
form of a request to the court to convert the original motion.491

VI. DISCLOSURE
Of the many disclosure decisions rendered during the Survey
year, the following areas should be of interest to the practitioner.

A. CPLR 31 01(d)'02
CPLR 3101(d)49Swas amended in 1985 to liberalize discovery
relating to trial experts. It contains two numbered paragraphs.'@'
Paragraph 1 requires, upon request, the prompt disclosure of the

486. See Yanni, 130 A.D.2d at 496, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
487. See Montgomery Ward, 127 A.D.2d at 913, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
488. See Jeraci, 129 A.D.2d at 558, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
489. See N.Y. CPLR 3211(a) (motion to dismiss).
490. See Four Seasons Hotels Ltd. v. Vinnik, 127 A.D.2d 310,515 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't
1987).
491. See Reed v. Shoratlantic Development Co., 121 A.D.2d 525,503 N.Y.S.2d 840 (2d
Dep't 1986).
492. See N.Y. CPLR 3101 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 688 (codified
493. See Act of July 1,1985, ch. 294,1985 MCKINNEY'S
at N.Y. CPLR 3101(d) (McKiney Supp. 1988)).
494. See id.
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name, qualifications, and expected testimony of any expert a party
anticipates calling at trial.'96 Medical, dental, and podiatric experts
are exempt from this provisi~n.'~~
Paragraph 2 is addressed to
materials subject to dis~losure.'~~
In Landmark Insurance Co. v. Beau Rivage R e s t a ~ r a n t , 'the
~~
Appellate Division, Second Department, held that investigation reports of experts retained by an insurer were not material prepared
for litigation, and were therefore subject to disclosure unless the
insurer had previously issued a disclaimer of coverage or had made
a firm decision to do
That view comports with the policy of
liberal disclosure under CPLR 3101(a).600It has received a mixed
following in other Survey year decisions involving the application
of material protected from disclosure under subsection (2) of
CPLR 3101(d).601
Another area of controversy concerns the special exception in
subparagraph (1)of CPLR 3101(d) for medical, dental, and podiatric malpractice cases.602Although the actual name of the expert
can be concealed, revealing the experts "qualifications" if they
tend to facilitate his identification may be problematic.60sIn Pizzi
u. M~ccia,~O'
the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that
in appropriate cases a court could strike a request for qualifications when it is demonstrated that the experts identity would be
re~ealed."~The Court denied plaintiffs motion to strike, however,

495. See id.
496. See id.
497. See id.
498. 121 A.D.2d 98, 509 N.Y.S.2d 819 (2d Dep't 1986).
499. See Landmark Ins., 121 A.D.2d a t 101, 509 N.Y.S.2d a t 823.
500. See N.Y. CPLR 3101(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
501. See id. 3101(d)(2);see also Crowe-Crimrnins-WOEv. Munier, 126 A.D.2d 696,507
N.Y.S.2d 428 (2d Dep't 1986) (reports relating to allegedly defective diesel engines discoverable under 3101(d)); Crowe v. Lederle Laboratories, 125 A.D.2d 875, 510 N.Y.S.2d 228 (3d
Dep't 1986) (report prepared by manufacturer's professional medical services department
was discoverable by p l a i n t s because it was prepared not only for litigation but to monitor
products claims). But see Wallace v. Benedictine Hospital, 124 A.D.2d 433, 507 N.Y.S.2d
533 (36 Dep't 1986) (material not discoverable); DiNova v. Sunnyview Hosp., 135 Misc. 2d
961, 517 N.Y.S.2d 410 (Sup. Ct., Rensselaer Co. 1987) (insurer's file not subject to discovery); Gentile v. Wakeel, 135 Mic. 2d 301, 514 N.Y.S.2d 878 (Sup Ct., Oneida Co. 1987)
(reports prepared by a private investigator retained by the defendant's liability insurer were
exempt from disclosure).
502. See N.Y. CPLR 3101(d)(l) ( M c K i e y Supp. 1988).
503. See id.
504. 127 A.D.2d 338, 515 N.Y.S.2d 341 (3d Dep't 1987).
505. See Pizzi, 127 A.D.2d a t 340, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t 343; see also McGoldrick v. W. M.
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because they did not meet their burden under CPLR 3103606of
showing how the identities would be revealed.607The Appellate Division, Second Department, adopted a more liberal view in Catino
v. KirschbaumSo8 and sustained the qualifications items requested.50gThe Second Department concluded that the qualifications requirement "is not to preclude any possibility of identifying
an adversary's medical expert."610

B. Expert Medical Witnesses
In Gilly v. City of New Y ~ r k , the
~ ~ lCourt of Appeals held
that, within certain limits, an opponent can subpoena his adversary's expert who has prepared a report that is not helpful to the
position of the party who retained him.612In Gilly, the defendant's
doctor prepared a report helpful to the
After a copy of
the report was sent to the plaintiff pursuant to Uniform Rule
202.17,614 she sought to have the physician testify at trial.s16 The
Court of Appeals, reversing the lower courts, held that the expert
could be compelled to relate the "substance" of his report.s16 The
Court focused on the fact that the doctor had reduced his report to
writing, which implied that an expert who gave an oral report
could not be forced to testify by the nonretaining party."7
C. Disclosure in Aid of Arbitration
Courts may not generally order discovery in aid of arbitrat i ~ n . In
~ ' Hendler
~
& Murray, P.C. u. Lambert,619however, the Ap-

Young, Jr. Health Ctr., 135 Misc. 2d 200, 514 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co. 1987).
506. See N.Y. CPLR 3103 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
507. See Pizzi, 127 A.D.2d a t 340, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
508. 129 A.D.2d 758, 514 N.Y.S.2d 751 (2d Dep't 1987)
509. See Catino, 129 A.D.2d at 759, 514 N.Y.S.2d a t 752.
510. Id.
511. 69 N.Y.2d 509, 508 N.E.2d 901, 516 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1987).
512. See Gilly, 69 N.Y.2d a t 510, 508 N.E.2d a t 902, 516 N.Y.S.2d a t 167.
513. See id. The expert in Gilly was a doctor hired by the defendant to determine
whether plaintips angina was caused by the defendant. See id. The physician prepared a
report favorable to the plaints, a copy of it was sent to the plaintiff pursuant to court rules,
and the plaintiff sought to have the physician testify a t trial. See id.
514. See MCKINNEY'S1987 N.Y. RULESOF THE COURT$ 202.17 (22 NYCRR 202.17).
515. See Gilly, 69 N.Y.2d a t 509, 508 N.E.2d a t 901, 516 N.Y.S.2d a t 166.
516. See id. a t 509, 508 N.E.2d a t 902, 516 N.Y.S.2d a t 167.
517. See id. a t 512, 508 N.E.2d a t 904, 516 N.Y.S.2d a t 168.
518. See Hendler & Murray v. Labert, 127 A.D.2d 820, 511 N.Y.S.2d 941 (2d Dep't
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pellate Division, Second Department, held that document discovery was authorized on the trial court's discretionary finding that
the documents were "required to present a proper case to the arbitrat~r."~~O
Absent extraordinary circumstances, it is unlikely that
courts will permit examination before trial in an arbitration hearing. The decision in Hendler hints, however, that the gates may be
opening.

D: FOIL Disclosure
In M. Farbman & Sons, Inc. v. New York City Health & Hospitals C0rp.,6~lthe Court of Appeals held that a party could use
the Freedom of Information
to obtain materials not available through disclosure under the CPLR.62SDuring the Survey year
the Court of Appeals held in Capital Newspapers v. Whalen634
that if a private document is among the records retained by a government agency, it is also subject to FOIL discl~sure."~Thus, a
document having nothing to do with a government function will
not be exempt from FOIL requests if it is a "record," it is "kept"
or "held" by an agency, and it is not otherwise subject to a specific
exemption under the FOIL.626

E. Sanctions for Disclosure Abuses
Under CPLR 3126,627any party or person who refuses to obey

1987) Courts may not order discovery in aid of arbitration unless the movant has demonstrated extraordinary circumstances. See id. a t 821, 511 N.Y.S.2d a t 942.
519. See id.
520. Id. (quoting In re Moock v. Emmanuel, 99 A.D.2d 1003, 473 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1st
Dep't 1984)).
521. 62 N.Y.2d 75, 464 N.E.2d 437,476 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1984).
522. See Farbman, 62 N.Y.2d a t 77,464 N.E.2d a t 440,476 N.Y.S.2d a t 73 (citing N.Y.
PUB.OFF. LAW$4 91-99 ( M c K i e y 1983)).
523. See id. a t 78,464 N.E.2d a t 440,476 N.Y.S.2d a t 74. The Court of Appeals refuses:
to read into the FOIL the restriction that, once litigation commences, a party forfeits the rights available to all other members of the public and is conferred to
discovery in accordance with article 34. If the Legislature had intended to exempt
agencies involved in litigation from FOIL, i t certainly could have so provided.
Id. a t 77-78, 464 N.E.2d a t 440, 62 N.Y.S.2d a t 71-72.
524. 69 N.Y.2d 246, 505 N.E.2d 932, 513 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1987).
525. See Capital Newspapers, 69 N.Y.2d a t 248, 505 N.E.2d a t 936, 513 N.Y.S.2d a t
368.
526. See id.
527. See N.Y. CPLR 3126 (McKinney 1987).
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an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information is
subject to sanction.628Last year's Survey warned the practitioner
that he should expect to be held accountable to strict compliance
with CPLR 3126.62sThis year's decisions warrant the same message.6s0The appellate divisions have not been reluctant to dismiss
complaints,Bs*strike a n s w e r ~ , 6and
~ ~impose monetary sanctions for
failure to comply with disclosure orders.6ss

F. Article 31 Superceded by SCPA
In Will of Devine,BS4the Appellate Division, First Department,
held that the Surrogate improperly required the parties in a probate proceeding to comply with provisions of article 316s6when
they sought to have the decedent's paper examined. The First Department held that the disclosure provisions of section 1412 of the
Surrogates' Procedure Act,BS6which direct a preliminary executor
to make all papers of a decedent available for examination and

528. See id.
529. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t 120-21.
530. See Corona v. A-B-C Packaging Mach. Corp., 129 A.D.2d 763, 514 N.Y.S.2d 756
(2d Dep't 1987); Craigie v. Consolidated Edison Co., 127 A.D.2d 556,511 N.Y.S.2d 359 (2d
Dep't 1987); Scharlack v. Richmond Mem. Hosp., 127 A.D.2d 580, 511 N.Y.S.2d 380 (2d
Dep't 1987); Simon v. Avis Rent-A-Car, Inc., 125 A.D.2d 583, 511 N.Y.S.2d 384 (2d Dep't
1987); Carmen v. West Hudson Hosp., 129 A.D.2d 868, 514 N.Y.S.2d 137 (3d Dep't 1987);
Metflex Corp. v. Klafter, 123 A.D.2d 845,507 N.Y.S.2d 460 (2d Dep't 1986). But see Dauria
v. City of New York, 127 A.D.2d 459, 511 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1st Dep't 1987) (reversing the
supreme court's order striking the city's answer for failure to produce an employee who had
personal knowledge of the area where the plaintiff fell where the City had made a good faith
effort to comply with the disclosure request).
531. See Scharlack v. Richmond Mem. Hosp., 127 A.D.2d 580, 511 N.Y.S.2d 380 (2d
Dep't 1987) (complaint dismissed based on patient's nine-month unexcused failure to comply with discovery order). Carmen v. West Hudson Hosp., 129 A.D.2d 868,514 N.Y.S.2d 137
(3d Dep't 1987) (holding motion to dismiss should have been granted without condition
where plaintiffs failed to fde a timely note of issue, offered no acceptable excuse, and did not
provide court with affidavit of merits of case).
532. See Corona v. A-B-C Packaging Mach. Corp., 129 A.D.2d 763, 514 N.Y.S.2d 756
(2d Dep't 1987) (appellate division held trial court did not abuse its discretion to strike
answer as sanction, although the sanction was severe).
533. See Simon v. Avis Rent-A-Car, Inc., 125 A.D.2d 583,511 N.Y.S.2d 384 (vacatur of
automatic dismissal upon personal payment of $500 by plaintiffs attorney); Metflex Corp. v.
Klafter, 123 A.D.2d 845,507 N.Y.S.2d 460 (2d Dep't 1986) (fine of $1,500 imposed on party
who disregarded several court disclosure orders).
534. 126 A.D.2d 491, 511 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1st Dep't 1987).
535. See Deuine, 126 A.D.2d a t 493, 511 N.Y.S.2d a t 234 (citing N.Y. CPLR 3100-40
(McKinney Supp. 1988)).
536. N.Y. SCPA 8 1412 (McKiney 1982).
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copying, are inconsistent with and preempt article 31657to the extent that it requires papers to be specified with reasonable particularity and authorizes disclosure only after the filing of object i o n ~ The
. ~ ~court
~ also held that the Surrogate erred in resorting
to the legislative history of article 31 to interpret section 1412 of
the SCPA.63s

G. Disclosure Against State
CPLR 3102(f)640now provides that in any state court action in
which the state is properly a party, disclosure by the state will be
available as if the state were a private litigant.M1Moreover, a court
order is no longer required in order to obtain disclosure from the
state.642Requests for admissions and interrogatories are not available from the

H. Non-Party Document Discovery
Non-party document discovery is conducted in New York pursuant to CPLR 3120(b)"sS. which requires that a court order be
the Apobtained authorizing discovery. In Beiny v. Wynyar~l,"'~.~
pellate Division for the First Department held that documents obtained from a third party without proper notice under subsection
(b) must be suppressed and disqualified the law firm which failed
to follow the proper procedure under CPLR 3120.643.3

VII. RESJUDICATA
ANDCOLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL
Last year's Survey highlighted recent developments in the
doctrines of claim preclusion6" and issue pre~lusion.~'~
During

537. See N.Y. CPLR 3100-40 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
538. See Deuine, 126 A.D.2d a t 493, 511 N.Y.S.2d a t 233.
539. See id.; see also N.Y. SCPA 3 1412 (McKinney 1982).
540. See N.Y.CPLR 3102(f) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
541. See id.
542. See id.
543. See id.
543.1 N.Y. CPLR 3120(b) (McKinney 1987).
543.2 133 A.D.2d 37, 517 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1st Dep't 1987).
517 N.Y.S.2d a t 478-80.
543.3 See Beiny, 133 A.D.2d a t
544. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits bars a subsequent action between the parties, or persons in privity with them, from relitigating the
same cause of action. It bars the relitigtion of claims which might have been litigated as well
as those which actually were litigated. See O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353,429

-
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1987, both doctrines were liberally applied in a variety of
contexts.546
In Henry Model1 & Co. v. Minister, Elders & Deacons of the
Reformed Protestant Church,M7the Court of Appeals held the
doctrine of claim preclusion barred a sublessee's action based on a
renewal option in the prime leaseP4*In the prior civil court action
the landlord sought to recover possession and the plaintiff defended, in part, by asserting a right of possession arising from the
renewal clause in its lease.M9The Court held that the plaintiffs'
claim was "really nothing more than a resuscitated assertion of a
right to possession recast on terms of a new legal theory."5s0 Since
the claim could have been raised in the first action the Court concluded that "a party is not free to remain silent in an action in
which he is the defendant and then bring a second action seeking

N.E.2d 1158, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1981); Smith v. Russell Sage College, 54 N.Y.2d 185, 429
N.E.2d 746, 445 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1981).
545. As the doctrine of issue preclusion now stands, a valid final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction prevents relitigation by the parties or their
privies, of matters of fact or law actually litigated or necessarily determined, in the earlier
action. Two prerequisites must be met to apply the doctrine in New York State courts.
"First, the identical issue necessarily must have been decided in the prior action and be
decisive of the present action, and second, the party to be precluded .. must have had a
full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination." Kaufman v. Eli L i y & Co., 65
N.Y.2d 449, 453, 482 N.E.2d 63, 66, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584, 588 (1985).
546. For examples of cases in which claim preclusion was applied, see, e.g., Estate of
Young v. Williams, 810 F.2d 363 (2nd Cir. 1987) (prior action in which plaintiffs obtained
injunctive relief barred personal injury action on claim preclusion grounds); Kikland v. City
of Peekskill, 651 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (police commissioner's federal action barred
by prior adverse determination by New York State Division of Human Rights); Lawrence v.
McGuire, 651 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (prior state court judgment barred federal action); Multi-Communications, Inc. v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(prior decision of District of Columbia Court of Appeals barred second federal action);
Walentas v. Johnes, 126 A.D.2d 417, 510 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dep't 1987) (decision in prior
action holding that tenant had a right to have roommate live with him in apartment barred
landlord from denying existence of a valid landlord-tenant relationship in a subsequent
counterclaim). See infra notes 547-52 and accompanying text. For examples of cases in
which issue preclusion was applied, see, e.g., United States v. Diamond, 657 F. Supp. 1204
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (a physician's criminal conviction barred relitigation of the same issues by
h
i
m in civil action); Samhammer v. Home Mutual Ins.Co., 120 A.D.2d 59,507 N.Y.S.2d 499
(3d Dep't 1986) (hearing board determination precluded husband and nonparty wife from
subsequent civil litigation). See infra note 576 and accompanying text.
547. 68 N.Y.2d 456, 502 N.E.2d 978, 510 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1986).
548. See Henry Modell, 68 N.Y.2d a t 459, 502 N.E.2d a t 980, 510 N.Y.S.2d a t 67.
549. Minister, Elders & Deacons of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church v. 198
Broadway, Inc., 59 N.Y.2d 170,451 N.E.2d 164,464 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1983).
550. Henry Modell, 68 N.Y.2d a t 459, 502 N.E.2d a t 981, 510 N.Y.S.2d a t 66.

.
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relief inconsistent with the judgment in the first action by asserting what is simply a new legal theory."661
In Green v. Santa Fe I n d ~ s t r i e s the
, ~ ~Court
~
of Appeals refused to apply the doctrine of "res judicata" or "collateral estoppel"663when a similar action in federal court resulted in a dismissal on the merits.664The Court held that the prior dismissal did
not involve the resolution of factual
and that the party
against whom the doctrine was asserted was not in privity with the
parties in the federal litigation.666 However, in People v.
A~evedo,"~the Court of Appeals held that ultimate and evidentiary facts determined by an acquittal of the defendant in one
criminal proceeding were entitled to preclusive effect against the
People in a subsequent criminal proceeding against the same indiv i d ~ a lAcevedo
. ~ ~ ~ had been charged with robbery in two separate
incidents and was acquitted of the first charge.669In refusing to
permit the alleged victim of the first robbery to testify to having
seen the defendant the night of the incidents the Court stated that
the "[dlefendant, having once been acquitted by a jury, should not
a t a subsequent trial be subjected to the burden of meeting issues
that were already necessarily decided in his favor."560 The Court

551. Id. a t 458, 502 N.E.2d a t 980, 510 N.Y.S.2d a t 65.
552. 70 N.Y.2d 244, 514 N.E.2d 105, 519 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1981)
553. Id. Judge Hancock's terminology nothwithstanding, it should be noted that the
New York State Court of Appeals has adopted the "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion" terminology of section 68 of the the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. See American Ins. Co. v. Messinger, 43 N.Y.2d 184, 189 n.2,371 N.E.2d 789,792 n.2,401 N.Y.S.2d 36,
39 n.2 (1977); see ako Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should The Doctrine Of Issue Preclusion Make an Administrative Or Arbitral Determination Binding In A
Court Of Law, 55 FORDHAM
L. REV.63 (1986). "Consistent use of the terms 'claim preclusion' and 'issue preclusion' will help clarify the distinction between the two concepts in
judicial opinions and will minimize the confusion created when 'res judicata' is used to describe both of them." Carlisle, supra, a t 65.
554. See Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 576 F. Supp. 269, aff'd,742 F.2d 1434, cert. denied,
469 U.S. 917 (1984).
555. See Green, 70 N.Y.2d a t 246, 514 N.E.2d a t 107, 519 N.Y.S.2d a t 795 (issues regarding Martin Act not resolved in federal court action).
556. See id. a t 247, 514 N.E.2d a t 108, 519 N.Y.S. a t 796. Because the privity issue
involved questions of fact, summary judgment was improper. See id. a t 248, 514 N.E.2d a t
108, 519 N.Y.S. a t 797.
557. 69 N.Y.2d 478, 508 N.E.2d 665, 515 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1987).
558. See Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d a t 486-87, 508 N.E.2d a t 670-71, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t 759.
559. See id. a t 483, 508 N.E.2d a t 668, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t 757.
560. Id. a t 485, 508 N.E.2d a t 669, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t 758.
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distinguished People v. Go0dman,5~~
where it recently did not apply issue preclusion, on the grounds that it did not require going
Furthermore, adoption of the evidenbeyond the ultimate facts.wBe
tiary fact rule in Goodman would not have changed the result
reached.60S
Finally, the Appellate Division, First Department, refused to
give res judicata (claim preclusion) effect to a prior federal court
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of action.6a
The First Department rested its decision on the fact that, although
the same transaction was involved in the federal and state actions,
the federal court's dismissal was based solely on allegations of
fraud and was therefore not on the merits.606
A. Administrative Determinations

In Ryan v. New York Telephone Co.666the Court of Appeals
expanded the doctrine of issue preclusion to administrative determination~.~~'
The Ryan case was strongly criticized by several comrnentat~rs:~~
and during the Survey year the case was legislatively
overruled by section 623 of the Labor Law."s That section provides that no finding of fact or law contained in a decision rendered on a claim for unemployment insurance may be given
preclusive effect in subsequent litigation.670The limit is applicable
when the initial decision is made by a court appeal board or referee.671 It does not apply in a subsequent action which (1) itself
arises under the unemployment insurance article of the Labor

561. 69 N.Y.2d 32, 503 N.E.2d 996, 511 N.Y.S. 2d 565 (1986) (people not collaterally
estopped from presenting evidence to a second jury).
562. See Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d a t 489, 508 N.E.2d a t 669, 515 N.Y.S. 2d a t 759
563. See id. a t 490, 508 N.E.2d a t 670, 515 N.Y.S. 2d a t 759.
564. Evans v. L.F. Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin, Inc., 131 A.D.2d 278, 520 N.Y.S.2d
940, (1st Dep't 1987).
565. See id. a t 279, 520 N.Y.S.2d a t 940.
566. 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984).
567. See Ryan, 62 N.Y.2d a t 495, 467 N.E.2d a t 489, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t 825.
568. See Carlisle, supra note 553; see also Dusovic v. New Jersey Transit Bus Operations, Inc., 124 A.D.2d 634,508 N.Y.S.2d 26 (2d Dep't 1986) (a "reverse Ryan" fact pattern).
Dusovic is a good illustration of the inherent unfairness of the Court of Appeals reasoning in
Ryan.
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 387 (codified
569. See Act of July 7,1987, ch. 258,1987 MCKINNEY'S
a t N.Y. LAB.LAW§ 623 (McKinney Supp. 1988)).
570. See id.
571. See id.
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clearly any personal injury action on behalf of the plaintiffs
against Nu Way (the vehicle owner) is barred by the previous arbitration between Mr. Maldonado's assignee and Nu Way's insurance carrier, as the hospital, with which the plaintiffs were in
privity, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the
vehicle's identity in the prior forumPsl
If the plaintiffs assignee had prevailed before the arbitrator, the
result could not have been used aflirmatively on his behalf because
the defendant was not a party to the arbitration.682
Reference must also be made to Taylor v. A ~ h b y The
. ~ ~Ap~
pellate Division, Second Department, held that preclusive effect
should be given to a New Jersey arbitration award.684Only the defendants had been parties to the prior arbitration.686The practitioner should also be alert of the Court of Appeals decision in
Claim of G ~ i m a r a l e swhere
, ~ ~ ~ the Court held that the Appellate
Division, Third Department, had erred in not giving preclusive effect to an arbitrator's factual findings regarding a claimant's
The above Survey year decisions should cause the bench and
bar to recognize that the typical justification for giving preclusive
effect to arbitral determinations must have limited application in
judicial proceedings.6s8 Before applying the doctrine to arbitral
findings, courts should permit the party seeking to avoid preclusion to show factors which can raise a rebuttable presumption that
the nonjudicial determinations be denied preclusive effect.68s
Although a decision to grant issue preclusion needs to be
based on the specific circumstances of each case, such factors
should include: (1) the existence of admissible evidence, unavailable at the previous hearing (because, for example, full disclosure
was not available, tending to support the position of the party defending against preclusion); (2) a showing that the party defending
against preclusion was denied the opportunity to present evidence

581.
582.
583.
584.
585.
586.
587.
588.
589.

Id. at 737, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
See id. at 738, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
134 A.D.2d 248, 520 N.Y.S.2d 587 (2d Dep't 1987).
See Taylor, 134 A.D.2d at 250, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
See id., 520 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
68 N.Y.2d 989, 503 N.E.2d 113, 510 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1986).
See Guimarales, 68 N.Y.2d at 991, 503 N.E.2d a t 116, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
See supra note 572 and accompanying text.
See id.
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and cross-examine witnesses, or that the effectiveness of such presentation and cross-examination was severally limited by the presiding officer at the nonjudicial forum or because the evidence was
inadmissible under the rules of that forum; and (3) a showing that
the party was not represented by an attorney in the previous
action.
When this presumption is raised on the ground of the existence of new evidence, the party seeking to invoke preclusion may
rebut by showing that the sum of the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the party defending against preclusion, could not
support an alternate finding. Similarly, when the presumption is
raised on the ground of a denial of the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, or the severe limitation of this
opportunity, the party seeking to invoke preclusion must demonstrate that such opportunity would not have resulted in a different
determination.
Finally, when the party defending against preclusion has
raised this presumption by showing that he was not represented by
an attorney, the party seeking preclusion may successfully rebut it
in two ways. The first is by demonstrating that the defending
party was fully aware of the possible preclusive effect of the earlier
determination (such as by showing that the judicial action was
commenced prior to the one in the nonjudicial forum) and that the
party was afforded an opportunity to present evidence and crossexamine witnesses. The second is to demonstrate that the party
had the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and that the evidence on which the nonjudicial determination was based was sufficiently reliable to be termed a judicial
action.
It does not follow that denying preclusive effect to arbitration
awards will render these decisions meaningless. Arbitral findings
may be admissible as evidence in subsequent court proceedings
subject to the usual rules of evidence. This approach will permit
many findings of fact to be used for impeachment purposes without resulting in the harsh results of Maldonado or in the mechanical application of the doctrine by the Court of Appeals in the
Claim of G u i r n a r a l e ~ . ~ ~ ~

590. See supra notes 577-86and accompanying text.
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VIII. MISCELLANEOUS
During the Survey year some other decisions emerged that
merit mentioning.

A. Certificate of Merit in Medical Malpractice Actions
The recent amendment to CPLR 3012-a591requires a certificate of merit as a prerequisite to filing a medical malpractice
case.592The first decision rendered subsequent to the passage of
CPLR 3012-a5gs was Steinberg v. Brookdale Hospital Medical
Center.694The court held that the failure to file a certificate was
not jurisdictional, and therefore did not mandate dismissal of the
action where the certificate was subsequently served.696The plaintWs late service of the certificate was therefore not fatal, and he
was given leave to re-serve the complaint together with the requisite certificate within twenty days after service of the copy of the
Under CPLR 3012-a6e7the practitioner should seek a qualified
expert evaluation as soon as possible.598Failure to do so can lead
to the imposition of sanctions under CPLR 8303(a)."g9 Counsel
should immediately obtain all pertinent hospital records including
x-rays, prior medical records and reports, fetal monitoring strips,
photographs and any other material that will familiarize the expert
with the case. The next step would be to screen all potential candidates and select an expert who is competent and credible.600

591. See Act of July 30, 1987, ch. 507, 1987 MCKINNEY'SSESS. LAWSOF N.Y. 855-56
(codified a t N.Y. CPLR 3012-a (McKiney Supp. 1988)).
592. N.Y. CPLR 3012-a (McKinney Supp. 1988).
593. See id.
594. 134 Misc. 2d 268,510 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct., King's Co. 1986); see also Cirigliano
v. De Perio, 134 Misc. 2d 1065,514 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct., Erie Co. 1987) (holding it would
be inappropriate to consider the certificate a "nullity" as the court did in the Steinberg
case).
595. See Steinberg, 134 Misc. 2d a t 268, 510 N.Y.S.2d a t 797.
596. See id. a t 271, 510 N.Y.S.2d a t 801.
597. N.Y. CPLR 3012-a (McKinney Supp. 1988).
598. See id.
599. See N.Y. CPLR 8303(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988)
600. See Stone, Choosing The Right Medical Expert For Your Malpractice Case,
N.Y.S.T.L.A. Bill of Particulars, Sept-Oct. 1987, a t 6, col.1.
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B. Emotional Distress: A New Cause of Action?
In Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hospital,601 the Court of
Appeals created a new cause of action in tort for the recovery of
damages for emotional distress derived from a persons subjective
feeling of guilt following the negligently given advice of a physi~ian.~O*
The holding is limited, however, by the Court of Appeals'
explicit classification of this case as one involving unusual circumstances.Bo3The practitioner should still be prepared to inform and
advise clients with respect to a possible claim under the Martinez
rationale.Bo4The practitioner should also be aware of an emerging
area of products safety law which encourages plaintiffs to seek
compensation for the mental anguish and anxiety arising from the
fear of contracting cancer in the future.606 The majority of
cancerphobia claims have arisen in asbestos and DES claims.606
C. Collateral Source Rule
CPLR 454V07limits the recovery of certain damages when a
plaintiff will be collaterally reimbursed for them.608The first Survey year decision to apply newly added subdivision (c) of CPLR
4545 was Budano v. Messina,60Bwhere the Supreme Court of New
York County eliminated most of a jury's award of $151,000 for loss
of past and future earnings because of collateral benefits available
to the plaintiff in the form of social security benefits.610 The

601. 70 N.Y.2d 697, 512 N.E.2d 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1987).
602. See Martinez, 70 N.Y.2d a t 700, 512 N.E.2d a t 539, 518 N.Y.S.2d a t 956 (Titone,
J., dissenting).
603. See id. a t 699, 512 N.E.2d a t 538-39, 523 N.Y.S.2d a t 956.
604. See Connors, Pandora's Box Opened in Expansion of Recovery for Emotional
Distress, 197 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4,1987, a t 1, col. 1 (historical analysis of recovery for emotional
distress).
605. See Mayesh & Rome, Compensation for Cancerphobia: The Return of High Anxiety, 198 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 1987, a t 1, col. 1 (discussing trends in other jurisdictions and
predicting new issue for New York Courts).
606. See id.
607. See N.Y. CPLR 3 4545 (McKinney 1986)).
608. See id. 3 4545. The amendment added subdivision (c) which is applicable to personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death actions where a plaintiff seeks to recover
for the cost of medical care, custodial care, rehabilitation services, loss of earnings, or other
economic loss. See id. 3 4545(c). Here, collateral-source evidence is available to mitigate
damages; however, the rule does not apply to life insurance. See id.
609. 197 N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1987, a t 19, col. 2. (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.).
610. See id.
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Budano case has been sharply criticized by several prominent cornmentat~rs.~ll
Budano, however, is an important example of trial
strategy.612Should reference to collateral source payments and the
court's obligation to reduce the verdict after trial be raised and
included in the jury instructions? In Budano none of the parties
requested such an instruction and none was given.BIS

D. Periodic Payment of Awards
Article 50-B became effective on July 30, 1986.614It requires
that the jury be asked to render a verdict itemizing damages between past special, past general, future special, and future general
damages.B16The first Survey year appellate decision to apply article 50-B was Cabreaja v. New York City Health & Hospitals
C~rp.~
The
' ~ Appellate Division, First Department, held that because the Article was passed after the commencement of a medical
malpractice action, but prior to the scheduled examination of an
infant, recovery of damages in excess of $250,000 may be paid on a
periodic basis, rather than in a single lump sum.817
E. Moving for Leave to Appeal in the Court of Appeals
In 1986, the right of appeal to the Court of Appeals was limited and the need to move for leave expanded.618In Quain v. Buzzetta Construction Corp.,6l9 the Court of Appeals struck portions
of a defendant appellant's jurisdictional statement and brief that
sought to raise issues not included in its motion to leave.BPOThe
Court stated:
[Olrdinarily when the court grants a motion for leave to appeal
all issues of which the court may take cognizance may be addressed by the parties. Where, however, the party seeking leave

611. See Kramer & Kramer, Medical Malpractice, 197 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 28, 1987, a t 1,
col. 1.
612. See Budano, 197 N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1987, a t 20, col. 2 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.)
613. See id.
614. See Act of July 30,1986, ch. 682,1986 MCKINNEY'S
SESS.LAWS
OF N.Y. 1565 (codified a t N.Y. CPLR 5041 (McKinney Supp. 1988)).
615. See id.
616. 129 A.D.2d 516, 514 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1st Dep't 1987).
617. See Cabreaja, 129 A.D.2d a t 518, 514 N.Y.S.2d a t 371.
618. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t 82-83.
619. 69 N.Y.2d 376, 507 N.E.2d 294, 514 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1987).
620. See Quain, 69 N.Y.2d a t 379, 507 N.E.2d a t 296, 514 N.Y.S.2d a t 704.
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specifically limits the issues to be raised, it is bound thereby and
may not thereafter raise other questions.sZ1

The practitioner, therefore, should be careful to seek leave to appeal on all issues. Frivolous or unimportant issues, however, which
are usually good bets for denial, should not be included in the
leave.

IX. CONCLUSION
Your author is grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions made by many members of the bench and bar. Positive comments from Daniel Kramer, Esq., Judge Weinfeld and Judge McLaughlin of the United States District Courts for the Southern and
Eastern Districts, Justice Green from the Fourth Department, and
Justice Rubin and Presiding Justice Mollen from the Second Department are appreciated more than they can imagine.
Special acknowledgment is also due, in alphabetical order to
Professor Oscar 0. Chase, Professor Richard T. Farrel, and Professor David D. Siegel. Each has generously welcomed and guided a
new guy to the New York Civil Practice block.

621. Id. at 402, 507 N.E.2d at 317, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE OF NEW CPLR AMENDMENTS
CPLR SECTION

EFFECTIVE DATE

211

8-7-87

Added new subd. (e), making a twenty year limitation period applicable to actions or proceedings to enforce orders or judgments
awarding support, alimony or maintenance.
Amended to extend applicability of statute to "Agent Orange" actions commenced not later than 6-16-88.
Amended to provide alternative means of satisfying mailing requirements of substituted service and "nail and mail" procedures.
Amended to add provision that personal service upon a board or
commission of a town or village may also be made by delivering the
summons to the clerk of the town or village.
Amended to provide that a writing designating an agent for service
be "executed and acknowledged in the same manner as a deed."
Amended to make rule that a corporation or voluntary association
shall appear by an attorney; subject to "sections 501 and 1809" of
the uniform justice court act.

Amended to add requirement that an appellate court to which a
motion for leave to appeal as a poor person has been or will be
taken. Shall hear such motion on the merits.
Amended to apply to podiatric malpractice actions.
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Amended to apply to podiatric malpractice actions.
Amended to apply to podiatric malpractice actions.
Amended to revise definition of trust for purposes of property for
exemption.
Amended to redefine amounts that may be subject to an income
execution and to require that the execution contain a statement, as
set out in subd. (g), advising the debtor of limitations on the
amounts that may be deducted, and of the procedures for challenging such executions.
Amended to provide that determinations of mistake of fact applications objecting to income executions issued by the sheriff of the
clerk of the court, be made by the court rather than the issuer, to
provide that applications to the Family Court be made to the court
having jurisdiction under FCA 461 and that such applications be
by petition on notice to creditor, and to specify procedure for applications made to the Supreme Court.
New subd. (e) added to provide that a creditor is not rquired to
issue process under CPLR 5241 prior to obtaining relief under
CPLR 5242.
Make provision relating to appearance by judicial officer applicable
to proceedings brought by a party to a pending action or proceeding, and eliminating requirement that proceedings be brought by a
party to a pending criminal action or to a proceeding involving the
custody of a child.
Amended to increase amounts of certain fixed fees of sheriffs in
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counties within the City of New York.
Amended to increase from ten dollars to fifteen dollars, the mileage fee of the sheriff of the city of New York for mileage traveled
within such city.
Amended to increase from thirty-five dollars to one hundred dollars the fee to a county clerk for the assignment of an index
number.
Amended to clarify language related to the payment of fee of seventy dollars to a county clerk for placing a cause on a calendar for
trial or inquest, and added an exception which authorizes a fee of
fifty dollars where the rules of the chief administrator of the courts
require that a request for judicial intervention be made in a pending action.
New section added entitled "Fee on civil appeal."
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APPENDIX B

NEW COURT FEES AS OF NOVEMBER 5,1987
STATUTE

DESCRIPTION OF FEE

OLD FEE

NEW FEE

CPLR 8018(a)
CPLR 8020(a)

Index Number
RJI
Note of Issue
Jury Demand*
Civil Appeal

$35

$100

CPLR 8020(c)
CPLR 8022
SPCA 2402(5)
SPCA 2402(8)

SPCA 2402(9)(a)

SPCA 2402(10)(i)
SPCA 2402(10)(ii)
SPCA 2402(10)(iii)
SPCA 2402(10)(iv)
SPCA 2402(10)(v)

Recording
Values:
Less than $10,000
$10,000 to $20,000
$20,000 to $50,000
$50,000 to $100,000
$100,000 to $250,000
$250,000 to $500,000
Over $500,000
Filing Fees:
SPCA 607
SPCA 711 (Fiduciary)
SPCA 711 (Customer
to Guarantee)
SPCA 715
SPCA 717
SPCA 1401
SPCA 1420
SPCA 1421
SPCA 1502
SPCA 1508
SPCA 1703
SPCA 2003
SPCA 2102
SPCA 2103
SPCA 2107
SPCA 2108
SPCA 2205
EPTL 7-4.6
Demand for Jury Trial
Objections to Probate
Note of Issue
Objection to Answer
Will for Safekeeping

$50

---

$50
$200
$41pg
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SPCA 2402(10)(vi)

SPCA 2402(11)
SPCA 2402(12)
SPCA 2402(13)(a)
SPCA 2402(13)(b)
SPCA 2402(14)

SPCA 2402(15)(a)
SPCA 2402(15)(b)
SPCA 2402(16)(a)
SPCA 2402(16)(b)
SPCA 2402(16)(c)
NYCCCA 1911(a);
UDCA 1911(a)(l);
UCCA 1911(a)(2)
NYCCCA 1911(b);
UDCA 1911(a)(2);
UCCA 1911(a)(l)
NYCCCA 1911(c);
UCCA 1911(a)(3)
NYCCCA 1911(d);
UDCA 1911(a)(9);
UCCA 1911(a)(4)
NYCCCA 1911(e);
UDCA 1911(a)(3);
UCCA 1911(a)(5)
NYCCCA 1911(f);
UDCA 1911(a)(4);
UCCA 1911(a)(6)
NYCCCA 1911(g);
UDCA 1911(a)(5);
UCCA 1911(a)(7)
NYCCCA 1911(h);
UDCA 1911(a)(6);
UCCA 1911(a)(8)
NYCCCA 1911(i);
UDCA 1911(a)(7);
UCCA 1911(a)(9)

Bond:
Less than $10,000
$7
Over $10,000
$15
Transcript
$7
Certificate of Letters
$2
Certifying Will
$31pg
Authenticating W i
$7
Searching and Certifying Records:
Under 25 years
$15
Over 25 years
$40
Producing Paper
$15
Messenger Fee
$.I5
Recording
$4/pg wl
$8 min.
Foreign Will
$4/pg wl
$30 min.
$4
Taxing Bill of Costs
Issuance of Summons, etc.
$20

$51pg wl
$10 min.
$5/pg wl
$40 min.
$5
$25

Filiig

$20

$25

Infant's Compromise

$20

$25

Notice of Trial

$20

$25

Judgment upon Confession

$20

$25

Notice of Appeal

$15

$19

Satisfaction of Judgment

$3

$4

Demand for Jury Trial

$35

$44

Exemplification

$6

$8
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NYCCCA 19116);
UDCA 1911(a)(8)
UCCA 1911(a)(10)
NYCCCA 1911(k);
UCCA 1911(a)(ll)
NYCCCA 1911(1)

157
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Certification

$3

$4

Notice of Petition

$20

$25

Name Change

$30

$38
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